lunes, 6 de febrero de 2012

Gobierno de España S.A

El Ejecutivo se suma a la ola tecnócrata que recorre la UE con el fichaje de ejecutivos de los principales sectores económicos. El mundo de las finanzas copa puestos clave a las puertas de la reestructuración que exige Europa


PERE RUSIÑOL BARCELONA 29/01/2012 08:20 Actualizado: 29/01/2012 14:30

Los ministros de Fomento, Ana Pastor; Exteriores, José Manuel García-Margallo; e Industria, José Manuel Soria, junto a ejecutivos de las grandes empresas españolas.


Cuando, el pasado martes, los altos ejecutivos de las grandes empresas se reunieron solemnemente con el Gobierno del PP en el Palacio de Viana de Madrid para potenciar juntos la marca España, es posible que dedicaran un buen rato a darse recuerdos antes de ponerse a trabajar.

El presidente de Endesa, Borja Prado, por ejemplo, podía mandar saludos al ausente ministro de Economía, Luis de Guindos, que se sentó en su consejo hasta el mismo momento en que Mariano Rajoy formó gobierno. Y Matías Rodríguez Inciarte, que acudió en representación del Banco Santander, preguntar por el exjefe de la asesoría jurídica del banco, Jaime Pérez Renovales, reclutado por Soraya Saénz de Santamaría como subsecretario de Presidencia. O el máximo ejecutivo del BBVA, Francisco González, interesarse quizá por Román Escolano, su director de Relaciones Institucionales hasta hace apenas un mes, cuando fue nombrado presidente del Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO). O Florentino Pérez (ACS) indagar sobre Marta Silva, la secretaria de su primer mandato en la Junta del Real Madrid y ejecutiva de su máxima confianza, a quien el ministro de Justicia, Alberto Ruiz Gallardón, ha designado abogada general del Estado.






La lista es larguísima: el presidente de Iberdrola, Ignacio Sánchez Galán, podría haber preguntado a su vez por el secretario de Estado de Economía, Fernando Jiménez Latorre, que en plena guerra con ACS firmó, desde la consultora NERA, un dictamen por encargo de la eléctrica dándole la razón. Y James Muir, presidente de Seat, tuvo la oportunidad de dejar atrás rencillas del pasado e interesarse por Luis Valero, flamante secretario de Estado de Industria y pymes tras años al frente de Anfac, la patronal del automóvil.
Lobbies en el Consejo


Mariano Rajoy ha situado en el Consejo de Ministros a destacados miembros del lobby financiero el propio Luis de Guindos, exdirectivo de Lehman Brothers en España y consejero del Banco Mare Nostrum, al frente de Economía, el armamentístico Pedro Morenés, consejero de hasta seis compañías del ramo en la cartera de Defensa, y el petrolero, con Miguel Arias Cañete como titular de Medio Ambiente, entre otros.

Pero ha sido con el nombramiento de los siguientes escalafones del Gobierno secretarios de Estado, subsecretarios, presidentes de organismos oficiales cuando la impronta "tecnócrata" ha quedado más apuntalada, con vinculaciones directas en prácticamente todos los grandes sectores económicos de España.

"Aquí no estamos tan acostumbrados a este fenómeno, pero en países anglosajones es lo habitual", opina José Ramón Pin, profesor de Ética Empresarial de la escuela de negocios IESE. A su juicio, se trata de una característica globalmente positiva: "En un Ejecutivo que reúne tanta experiencia en situaciones tan distintas, la capacidad de gestión aumenta", sostiene.

Este es precisamente el razonamiento del Gobierno: atraerse a los mejores profesionales para que el Ejecutivo sea más competente. De hecho, esta es una de las características que mejor describe la ola tecnócrata que recorre la UE tras la sucesión de victorias electorales de la derecha: la inclusión en el Consejo de Ministros de ejecutivos procedentes directamente de la gran empresa en general y del sector financiero en particular.


El mismo debate es especialmente vivo en el sector financiero y en toda la UE: destacados ejecutivos de la gran banca han ido copando los puestos económicos clave en los países de la UE a medida en que aumentaba la presión para regular el sector. Hoy su huella alcanza ya 17 de los 27 ejecutivos comunitarios, pese a que todos los expertos sitúan a la gran banca de inversión en el origen del crash.El nacionalista Artur Mas abrió en España el camino que ahora ha seguido Rajoy. Tras el triunfo en las autonómicas de 2010, Mas formó un equipo de importante componente tecnócrata, que llamó "el Gobierno de los mejores" y que incluye al frente de Sanidad a Boi Ruiz, el exjefe de la patronal sanitaria privada, que simboliza también la otra cara de la moneda: el potencial conflicto de intereses. No necesariamente desde un punto de vista personal la ley regula los casos que obligan a inhibirse o a abstenerse, como político: ¿la gestión del consejero de Sanidad, que promueve drásticos recortes y niega incluso que la salud sea un derecho, busca realmente la mejora de la sanidad pública o reforzar a sus colegas de la patronal privada?

Captura del regulador


"Esto es precisamente lo que ha sucedido con la crisis y nos ha llevado a la catástrofe", recalca Comín. Y concluye: "Pese a ello, el fenómeno se extendió también a la Unión Europea y ahora llega a España con gran intensidad"."El problema es claro y tiene un nombre académico: la captura del regulador", advierte Antoni Comín, profesor de Ciencias Sociales de la escuela de negocios Esade, quien explica el concepto así: "El servidor público que debe regular un sector es capturado por técnicos procedentes de ese mismo sector, al que lógicamente volverá, y muy bien retribuido, cuando regrese al sector privado".

La banca tiene una gran presencia en el Ejecutivo de Mariano Rajoy. Empezando por el ministro de Economía, Luis de Guindos, el hombre de Lehman Brothers en España cuando el banco quebró, que luego pasó a Nomura y después al área financiera de PwC y al consejo del Banco Mare Nostrum. Pero va mucho más allá: tanto en su equipo como en el del otro polo económico del Gobierno el de Cristóbal Montoro en Hacienda abundan los ejecutivos procedentes del sector financiero.


El fichaje de Flavia Rodríguez-Ponga para la Dirección general de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones del Ministerio de Economía es un ejemplo de lo que en el mundo anglosajón se conoce como "puerta giratoria": fue durante 12 años alto cargo de esta misma dirección general hasta que, en 2004, tras la victoria del PSOE, se convirtió en ejecutiva de Mutua Madrileña, una de las empresas punteras del mismo sector que supervisaba desde el Ministerio. Y ahora se completa al emprender el camino de regreso, al frente de la dirección general, justo en el momento en que los fondos de pensiones privados sufren una importante crisis y su patronal reclama nuevas exenciones fiscales y la reforma urgente del sistema público para empujar a los ciudadanos hacia los fondos privados."Todas las patas principales del sector están muy bien representadas en los puestos clave: la banca de inversión internacional, con Barclays y antiguos ejecutivos de Lehman Brothers; la gran banca nacional, con el Santander y el BBVA; las consultoras financieras [PwC y NERA, vinculada a Marsh & McLennan] y los seguros y fondos de pensiones privados, como Mutua Madrileña", subraya Alejandro Inurrieta, profesor del Instituto de Estudios Bursátiles.


Desembarco



El desembarco masivo de ejecutivos procedentes del sector financiero en el Gobierno de Rajoy no se produce en un momento cualquiera: coincide con la exigencia de la UE de una restructuración a fondo de la banca, lo que se ha convertido también en una des las grandes prioridades del Ejecutivo.El jueves, el ministro de Hacienda, Cristóbal Montoro, anunció que el Gobierno mejorará la fiscalidad de los planes de pensiones privados, pese a que esta misma semana la OCDEthink-tank de los países ricos, referencia de la ortodoxia liberal advertía de que estas ayudas fiscales son ineficientes y sugería incluso su eliminación.

Pese a que el sector está en ebullición y, por tanto, no todos los actores tienen exactamente los mismos intereses, los elogios a los primeros pasos del nuevo Ejecutivo han sido notables. El viernes, en una entrevista en The Wall Street Journal, el presidente del BBVA, Francisco González, no ocultaba su euforia: "El nuevo Gobierno está absolutamente comprometido a resolver los problemas del sistema financiero español de una vez por todas", explicaba.

El banquero se mostraba optimista también ante la evolución de la UE, "una vez se han ido los gobiernos que lo han hecho mal", una alusión, según el rotativo estadounidense, a Silvio Berlusconi y José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

Optimismo



De Guindos ha mantenido formalmente una actitud de dureza ante el sector financiero, instándole a emprender una restructuración rápida, una recapitalización de al menos 50.000 millones y límites salariales en los bancos receptores de dinero público. Pero más allá de las palabras, con apenas una semana en el cargo, ya tomó tres medidas simultáneas que supusieron un gran alivio para el conjunto del sector. Y también para BMN, que, según la mayoría de analistas, es uno de los candidatos a solicitar dinero público y en cuyo consejo se sentaba el ministro.

Las tres medidas se incluyeron en el decreto del 31 de diciembre que prorrogó los presupuestos: autorizó al Estado a otorgar avales al sector financiero por valor de 100.000 millones, prorrogó el plazo legal para que el suelo rústico conste en los balances como tal y no como urbanizable loque, según cálculos de Inurrieta, salvó a la banca de provisionar 30.000 millones y evitó que las cajas se vean obligadas a reconvertirse en fundaciones si pasan a controlar menos del 50% del capital del banco con el que ejercen la actividad financiera, lo que amenazaba, sobre todo, a Bankia.

"En toda el área económica puede haber sospecha de conflicto de intereses", advierte Inurrieta, quien re-curre a la ironía: "Ahora no se sabe muy bien dónde acaba el Ibex y dónde empieza el Gobierno".






El marco legal


Ley de 2006


José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero impulsó en su primer mandato una ley para regular los conflictos de intereses de los miembros del Gobierno y de los altos cargos.


Inhibición y abstención


La norma obliga a ministros y altos cargos "a inhibirse del conocimiento de los asuntos en cuyo despacho hubieran intervenido o que interesen a empresas o sociedades en cuya dirección, asesoramiento o administración hubieran tenido alguna parte".


También los familiares


La obligación de inhibirse o abstenerse no sólo se da ante materias relacionadas con la actividad previa del alto cargo, sino también la de "su cónyuge o persona con quien conviva en análoga relación de afectividad, o familiar dentro del segundo grado y en los dos años anteriores a su toma de posesión como cargo público"

Las mentiras de Botín

De la web de Juan Torres Lopez, sale este gran articulo, donde si alguien albergaba dudas de quién es quién en este juego criminal, ahora las cosas tendrían que estar mucho más claras.
Ya no es una punta, son demasiadas puntas del iceberg que se ven, demasiadas máscaras están cayendo con pruebas en la mano a las cuales los poderes independientes no hacen ni caso.
Mal va España, y la sociedad en general cuando juzga y condena a jueces y declara inocentes a chorizos, corruptos, maleantes y vividores.




Miércoles, 01 de Febrero de 2012
El título de este artículo puede parecer demasiado fuerte y yo mismo reconozco que lo es. Pero es que me resulta muy difícil creer que el dueño de uno de los bancos más grandes del mundo esté tan mal informado de lo que viene ocurriendo en la economía y las finanzas mundiales como para decir lo que acaba de decir sobre los culpables de la crisis. Puede ser que le suceda lo que el Premio Nobel Stiglitz dice que le pasa a los banqueros centrales, que no ven la realidad porque están muy ideologizados y solo leen aquello que corrobora sus ideas. Pero incluso así, suponiendo que las declaraciones públicas de Botín fueran simplemente el resultado de su ignorancia, lo cierto es que con ellas engaña a la gente. Y es por eso que me parece justo calificarlas como mentiras o patrañas.
Los culpables de la crisis son los bancos
Acaba de declarar Botín anunciando los resultados de su banco que los responsables de la crisis son los políticos porque "no han sabido manejar la situación" (Público, 31-01-2012, "Botín culpa a los políticos de la crisis mundial".
Es mentira. Incluso alguien tan poco sospechoso de izquierdismo como Warren Buffet, uno de las tres o cuatro inversores más ricos del mundo, lo dijo claramente: "Los bancos se han expuesto demasiado, han asumido demasiados riesgos. Así que el problema es evidentemente de los bancos. Son quienes tienen la culpa. No hay por qué echársela a nadie más" (El País, 25-05-2008,"Los bancos tienen la culpa".
Y esa es la verdad. Hoy día sabemos a ciencia cierta que los responsables últimos y directos de haber causado todo lo que ha pasado en la economía mundial han sido los bancos.
- Los bancos han provocado la crisis porque dejaron de cumplir su función de intermediarios entre el ahorro y la inversión productiva para destinar los recursos que recibían y creaban a la especulación improductiva.
- Los bancos han provocado la crisis porque, para ello, crearon y difundieron millones de productos financieros opacos y muy arriesgados, muy rentables inicialmente pero sumamente peligrosos a poco que cambiara la situación, como el tiempo demostró, es decir, pura basura financiera. La fueron acumulando en sus balances mientras traspasaban el riesgo a otros bancos o a los demás sujetos económicos y así dieron lugar a la crisis financiera.





- Los bancos han provocado la crisis porque para difundir esos productos basura recurrieron a todo tipo de artimañas, fraudes, engaños, estafas, mentiras y trampas ante su clientela. Solo en España los jueces han dictado ya más de 400 sentencia condenatorias contra los bancos por colocar a sus clientes "swaps", permutas financieras o "clips", entre otras denominaciones comerciales, como si fueran un seguro ante la variación en los tipos de interés cuando en realidad era productos muy arriesgados que solo favorecían a las entidades bancarias (El Economista. Y esos 400 no son todos los casos porque la Asociación de Usuarios Afectados por Permutas y Derivados Financieros (Asuapedefin) calcula que en España existen entre 200.000 y 400.000 particulares y minoristas con este tipo de productos financieros (El Economista, 14-11-2011, La banca acumula más de 400 sentencias en contra por los 'swaps' hipotecarios). Y hay también otros 700.000 ahorradores españoles afectados por la estafa de las llamadas participaciones preferentes que los bancos colocaron también engañosamente sus clientes por un volumen total de unos 12.000 millones de euros, (TVE, El fraude de las preferentes).
- Los bancos han provocado la crisis porque para ocultar y disimular todas esas estafas contrataron a las agencias de calificación que calificaron como de máxima solvencia a las hipotecas y los derivados que colocaban en el mercado, creando así el clima de engaño y de falsa seguridad necesario para  multiplicar la difusión de millones de productos financieros que en realidad eran pura basura financiera.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis porque ellos mismos y sus empresas de tasación han sido los responsables directos de la subida de precios de la vivienda y de las burbujas inmobiliarias, lo que les convenía para que así aumentara el volumen de créditos que ofrecían a sus clientes.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis porque han abusado de su capacidad de creación de dinero mediante la generación de crédito saltándose para ello a la torera todas las reglas de la prudencia bancaria, dando créditos hipotecarios a más del 100% del valor de las viviendas o a empresas por encima de los niveles aconsejables.
- Los bancos son culpables de haber provocado la crisis porque, para aumentar sus beneficios, disimularon mediante trampas contables el riesgo que acumulaban y no acumularon el volumen de reservas necesario para hacer frente a la morosidad que irremediablemente iba a producirse como consecuencia de su propia política de sobreendeudamiento.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis porque es evidente que durante los últimos años han hecho todo lo que ha estado en sus manos para que los gobiernos aplicaran las políticas que han producido la gran desigualdad que a ellos les conviene para que los niveles altos de renta les proporcionen grandes volúmenes de ahorro y los bajos tengan que endeudarse más.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis por haber utilizado los paraísos fiscales y por ser los instrumentos necesarios para que se pueda llevar a cabo el fraude y la evasión fiscal que se encuentra a niveles tan desorbitados. Los bancos se han convertido en cooperadores necesarios del engaño a Hacienda y ellos mismos en una fuente principal de evasión de ingresos, disminuyendo así la capacidad de actuación de los gobiernos.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis por haber financiado también a la clase política más corrupta para que llevara a cabo las medidas de desregulación y permisividad que han ido necesitando para salir adelante.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis porque su actuación irresponsable les ha llevado a la quiebra impidiendo así que las empresas y consumidores dispongan de la financiación que es imprescindible para poder funcionar y crear empleo.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis porque, cuando estalló, en lugar de asumir el daño que habían provocado engañaron a los gobiernos y a la sociedad haciendo creer que se trataba de una situación pasajera cuando en realidad habían perdido toda su solvencia. Y porque reclamaron entonces y siguen reclamando ayudas y más ayudas como si fueran las últimas cuando saben perfectamente que todas las que reciban serán insuficientes puesto que su agujero patrimonial es gigantesco y los problemas que eso ha creado en el sistema bancario internacional es sencillamente irresoluble bajo las condiciones en que ha venido funcionando.
- Los bancos son culpables de la crisis por haber impuesto una política de retribuciones astronómicas a sus directivos para lograr así el aumento de sus beneficios con independencia de cualquier consideración ética o de los efectos de su actuación en el conjunto de la economía y la sociedad.
- Y, en fin, los bancos son culpables de la crisis porque es evidente que son ellos quienes están imponiendo las políticas que en lugar de permitirnos salir de la crisis es evidente que no llevan a una fase aún peor, de depresión, que sufriremos durante años.
La banca y la clase política
Miente también Botín cuando echa la culpa de la crisis a la clase política ocultando que la clase política no ha actuado motu proprio sino presionada constantemente por los bancos que se presentan ahora como los mercados.
Los bancos financian a los partidos, pagan a periodistas, son los dueños efectivos de los medios de comunicación, dominan incluso la decisión de los rectores universitarios y de los lideres de opinión. Son los que tienen el poder real en nuestras sociedades.
Así lo prueba mejor que nadie el propio Emilio Botín que solo gracias a que tiene más poder real que los gobiernos puede actuar con impunidad y cometer todo tipo de actos irregulares sin que sea condenado por ello. Así, según informó El País, consiguió que la entonces Secretaria de Estado de Justicia y posteriormente Vicepresidenta del Gobierno cursara al Abogado del Estado "instrucciones sobre su actuación en el caso de las cesiones de crédito", concretamente, pidiendo que no se dirigiera "acción penal alguna por presunto delito contra la Hacienda Pública, contra la citada entidad bancaria o sus representantes". Gracias a ello, ni siquiera fue juzgado por unas irregularidades financieras por las que la acusación solicitaba para el presidente del Banco de Santander "un total de 170 años de prisión y una multa de 46.242.233,92 euros (7.694.060.334 pesetas), además de una responsabilidad civil de 84.935.195,86 euros (14.132.027.499 pesetas), que es el perjuicio causado con su actuación a la Hacienda Pública". (El País, 27-05-2008, "Rato atribuye la decisión de no perseguir a Botín en 1996 a De la Vega").
Como también lo prueba el que Botín haya conseguido que el gobierno ya en funciones de Rodríguez Zapatero indultara de forma vergonzosa y vergonzante al consejero delegado del Banco de Santander condenado en firme por delinquir en el ejercicio de su actividad bancaria.
Las declaraciones de Botín ni siquiera se pueden considerar una verdad a medias. Como he demostrado en otros artículos, es verdad que la gran estafa cometida por los bancos no habría sido posible sin la complicidad de la mayoría de las autoridades, de gobiernos y bancos centrales que modificaron las leyes para que pudieran llevar a cabo sus tropelía, que miraron a otro lado cuando engañaban a la gente y cuando generaban el riesgo tremendo que se sabía que antes o después estallaría llevándose por delante a la actividad de millones de empresas y empleos. O que, ya en plena crisis, se han dedicado a salvar el bolsillo de los bancos y banqueros dándoles billones de euros a costa de los contribuyentes. Pero eso ha sido y es así, como he señalado, porque el poder real no lo tienen esas autoridades sino porque los bancos están llevando a cabo, en palabras de Habermas referidas concretamente a Europa, "la demolición de la democracia" imponiéndose cada vez más sobre los poderes representativos e incluso, como está sucediendo recientemente, suplantándolos directamente. Por eso no es nada de extrañar que Botín alabe al nuevo gobierno, es el suyo: un colega banquero, nada más y nada menos que procedente de Lehman Brothers, es el ministro de Economía y el director de la asesoría jurídica de su banco ha sido nombrado subsecretario de Presidencia (ver "Gobierno de España S.A.", Público 29-01-2012)
Y también fabula Botín cuando afirma que la reforma laboral es urgente para crear empleo y para resolver los problemas que ha planteado la crisis. Pero de eso me ocuparé en otro artículo que publicaré en los próximos días.

Los ricos, la riqueza y el neoliberalismo salvaje


Para ver lo que gana el 0,001% más rico del planeta y lo que se podría hacer con el dinero que gana 



Para ver quiénes son las personas más ricas del mundo y cómo hicieron sus fortunas


Para ver cuáles son las corporaciones más grandes del mundo y su comparación con los estados 



Y estos son unos cuantos arquitectos de esta locura neoliberal


El informe completo de la misión en Siria: censurado por Qatar y por los medios occidentales

Este es el informe completo donde queda claro lo que ocurre en Siria, en contradicción con lo que dice la prensa del imperio, atlantista, y del golfo.
Que no nos engañen, derrocar el gobierno sirio es el único objetivo. Y si hace falta matar a civiles, así será.
Bienvenidos a las nuevas técnicas de la CIA.


27/01/12 1 McAULEY 259.12D 12-21687

League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria

Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

“We offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to carry it, and were afraid of it; and man carried it. Surely he is sinful, very foolish” [Qur’an 33:72]

I . Legal bases

1. By resolution 7436 of 2 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted the Arab plan of action annexed thereto, welcomed the Syrian Government’s agreement to the plan, and emphasized the need for the Syrian Government to commit to the full and immediate implementation of its provisions.

2. On 16 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted resolution 7439 approving the draft protocol of the Legal Centre and the mandate of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria, namely to verify implementation of the provisions of the Arab plan of action to resolve the Syrian crisis and protect Syrian civilians. The resolution requested the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to take such steps as he deemed appropriate to appoint the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission and to make contact with the Syrian Government with a view to signing the Protocol.

3. By resolution 7441 of 24 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States requested the Secretary-General of the League to deploy the Observer Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic in order to fulfil its mandate under the protocol immediately on its signature.

4. The Syrian Arab Republic and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States signed the protocol on 19 December 2011. The protocol provided for the establishment and deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic of a Mission comprising civilian and military experts from Arab countries and Arab non- governmental human rights organizations. Paragraph 5 stated that the Mission should transmit regular reports on the results of its work to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab State and the Syrian Government for submission — via the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria — to the Council of the League at the ministerial level for its consideration and appropriate action.

5. On 20 December 2011, the Council of the League approved the appointment of General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi from the Republic of the Sudan as Head of the Observer Mission.

II. Formation of the Mission

6. The General Secretariat requested Member States and relevant Arab organizations to transmit the names of its candidates for the Mission. On that basis, 166 monitors from 13 Arab countries and six relevant Arab organizations have thus far been appointed.

III. Visit of the advance delegation of the General Secretariat to Syria

7. In preparation for the Mission, an advance delegation of the General Secretariat visited the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 December 2011 to discuss the logistical preparations for the Mission.

8. In accordance with the protocol, the Syrian Government confirmed its readiness to facilitate the Mission in every way by allowing the free and safe movement of all of the observers throughout Syria, and by refraining from hindering the work of the Mission on security or administrative grounds. The Syrian Government side also affirmed its commitment to ensuring that the Mission could freely conduct the necessary meetings; to provide full protection for the observers, taking into consideration the responsibility of the Mission if it were to insist on visiting areas despite the warning of the security services; and to allow the entry to Syria of journalists and Arab and international media in accordance with the rules and regulations in force in the country.

VI. Arrival and preliminary visits of the Head of Mission

9. The Head of the Mission, General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi, arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on the evening of Saturday 24 December 2011. He held a series of meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Walid Al-Moualem, and with Syrian Government officials, who stated that they stood

27/01/12 2 McAULEY 259.12D 12-21687

prepared to cooperate fully with the Mission and to endeavour to ensure its success, overcoming any obstacles that may arise. The necessary logistical and security arrangements were agreed.

10. The Syrian side stated that there were certain areas that the security protection detail would not be able to enter with the observers for fear of the citizens’ reaction. The Head of the Mission replied that that situation would enable the Mission to engage with citizens and opposition parties without government monitoring, thereby removing the citizens’ fear of repercussions as a result of communicating with the Mission.

11. The Head of the Mission completed the technical field preparations and secured the necessary transportation and communication devices in order to start work. He met with the observers who arrived successively in Syria and briefed them on their duties and the bases of their work under the protocol. The observers took a special oath for the Mission which had been drafted by the Head.

12. On 27 December 2011, the Head of the Mission and ten observers conducted a preliminary visit to the city of Homs, one of the epicentres of tension, which has seen acts of violence and armed confrontation between the Army and the Syrian opposition. Some security barriers separating districts remain in place.

13. Immediately on arriving in Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Governor of the city, who explained that there had been an escalation in violence perpetrated by armed groups in the city. There had been instances of kidnapping and sabotage of Government and civilian facilities. Food was in short supply owing to the blockade imposed by armed groups, which were believed to include some 3000 individuals. The Governor further stated that all attempts by religious figures and city notables to calm the situation had failed. He made enquiries regarding the possibility of addressing the issue of soldiers and vehicles blocked inside Baba Amr.

14. The Mission visited the residential districts of Baba Amr, Karam Al-Zaytun, Al-Khalidiyya and Al- Ghuta without guards. It met with a number of opposition citizens who described the state of fear, blockade and acts of violence to which they had been subjected by Government forces. At a time of intense exchanges of gunfire among the sides, the Mission witnessed the effects of the destruction wrought on outlying districts. The Mission witnessed an intense exchange of gunfire between the Army and opposition in Baba Amr. It saw four military vehicles in surrounding areas, and therefore had to return to the Governorate headquarters. It was agreed with the Governor that five members of the Mission would remain in Homs until the following day to conduct field work and meet with the greatest possible number of citizens.

15. Immediately on returning from Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Government and insisted that it withdraw military vehicles from the city, put an end to acts of violence, protect civilians, lift the blockade and provide food. He further called for the two sides to exchange the bodies of those killed.

16. At that meeting, the Syrian side agreed to withdraw all military presence from the city and residential areas except for three army vehicles that were not working and had been surrounded, and one that had been taken from the Army by armed groups. The Syrian side requested the Mission’s assistance to recover and remove those vehicles in exchange for the release of four individuals, the exchange of five bodies from each side, the entry of basic foods for families in the city, and the entry of sanitation vehicles to remove garbage. It was agreed at the end of the meeting that the Mission would conduct another visit to Homs on the following day in the company of General Hassan Sharif, the security coordinator for the Government side.

17. During that visit, the Mission was introduced to one of the leading figures in the opposition, who acted as media representative of the National Council. An extensive discussion took place regarding the offer of the Syrian Government and the best way to implement the agreement. As a result, the military vehicles were returned and removed; the bodies of those killed were exchanged; trucks entered the city with food; and three detainees and two women were released and returned to their families in the presence of the Mission, thereby calming the situation inside the city.

18. Five days after the monitors were deployed to five zones, the Ministerial Committee requested that the Head of the Mission report on the Mission’s work. He travelled to Cairo and gave an oral presentation to the members of the Committee at their meeting of 8 January 2012. It was decided that the work of the Mission should continue and that the Head of the Mission should submit a report at the end of the period determined in the protocol, on 19 January 2012. After the Head's return to Damascus to resume his duties, the Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists and opposition alike, particularly as a result of statements and media coverage in the wake of the Committee meeting. That did not, however, affect the work of the Mission or its full and smooth deployment across the country.

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19. Following its arrival, and to this date, the Mission has received numerous letters from the Syrian committee responsible for coordination with the Mission. The letters refer to the material and human losses sustained by Government institutions and offices as a result of what is described as sabotage. They assert that all of the States’ vital services have been affected.

V. Deployment of the Observer Mission to Syria

20. The observers were divided into 15 zones covering 20 cities and districts across Syria according to the time frame set out below. The variation in dates was a result of shortcomings in administrative and technical preparations, such as the arrival of cars and personnel. Care was taken to ensure even distribution of observers. Each unit comprised some ten observers of different Arab nationalities. The groups were deployed to Syrian governorates and towns as follows:

• On 29 December 2011, six groups travelled to Damascus, Homs, Rif Homs, Idlib, Deraa and Hama.

• On 4 January 2012, a group travelled to Aleppo.

• On 9 January 2012, two groups went to Deir Al-Zor and Latakia. However, both returned to Damascus on 10 January 2012 owing to attacks that led to the injury of two of the monitors in Latakia and material damage to the cars.

• On 10 January 2012, a group travelled to Qamishli and Hasaka.

• On 12 January 2012, a group travelled to Outer Damascus.

• On 13 January 2012, four groups travelled to Suwaida, Bu Kamal, Deir Al-Zor, Palmyra (Tadmur), Sukhna, Banyas and Tartous.

• On 15 January 2012, two groups travelled to Latakia, Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra. Annex 1. List of observers, their nationalities and their distribution.

21.

• • • • •

The observers were provided with the following: A map of the region; A code of conduct for observers; The duties of the group leaders; The duties of the observers; Necessary equipment such as computers, cameras and communication devices.

22. office is open 24 hours a day and is directly linked to the League of Arab States operations room in Cairo and to the groups deployed across Syria. The room receives daily reports from the field teams and conveys special instructions for monitoring. Owing to the volume of work, an additional operations room was opened at the Mission headquarters in Damascus with the task of allocating individuals and assigning committees on follow- up, detainees, the media and financial affairs. It coordinates with the main operations room at the offices of the League of Arab States.

23. In Latakia and Deir Al-Zor, the Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists. In Latakia, thousands surrounded the Mission’s cars, chanting slogans in favour of the President and against the Mission. The situation became out of control and monitors were attacked. Two sustained light injuries and an armoured car was completely crushed. In order to address the matter, the Head of Mission contacted the Syrian committee responsible for coordination with the Mission. Nevertheless, the Head of the Mission ordered the immediate return of the two groups to Damascus. He met the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made a strongly- worded formal protest. The Syrian side strongly condemned the incident and extended a formal apology, explaining that the events were not in any sense deliberate. In order to emphasize the point, the Syrian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs met with the members of the Latakia team and stated that the Syrian Government would address the shortcoming immediately and guarantee the safety and security of observers everywhere. He apologized to them for the unfortunate and unintentional incidents. The members were then assigned to new zones after four days’ rest.

VI. Implementation of the Mission’s mandate under the protocol

An operations room was established at the offices of the League of Arab States in Damascus. The

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24. The Head of the Mission stresses that this assessment in terms of the provisions of the protocol summarizes the findings of the groups as relayed by group leaders at their meeting with the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012.

A. Monitoring and observation of the cessation of all violence by all sides in cities and residential areas

25. On being assigned to their zones and starting work, the observers witnessed acts of violence perpetrated by Government forces and an exchange of gunfire with armed elements in Homs and Hama. As a result of the Mission’s insistence on a complete end to violence and the withdrawal of Army vehicles and equipment, this problem has receded. The most recent reports of the Mission point to a considerable calming of the situation and restraint on the part of those forces.

26. In Homs and Dera‘a, the Mission observed armed groups committing acts of violence against Government forces, resulting in death and injury among their ranks. In certain situations, Government forces responded to attacks against their personnel with force. The observers noted that some of the armed groups were using flares and armour-piercing projectiles.

27. In Homs, Idlib and Hama, the Observer Mission witnessed acts of violence being committed against Government forces and civilians that resulted in several deaths and injuries. Examples of those acts include the bombing of a civilian bus, killing eight persons and injuring others, including women and children, and the bombing of a train carrying diesel oil. In another incident in Homs, a police bus was blown up, killing two police officers. A fuel pipeline and some small bridges were also bombed.

28. The Mission noted that many parties falsely reported that explosions or violence had occurred in several locations. When the observers went to those locations, they found that those reports were unfounded.

29. The Mission also noted that, according to its teams in the field, the media exaggerated the nature of the incidents and the number of persons killed in incidents and protests in certain towns.

B. Verifying that Syrian security services and so-called shabiha gangs do not obstruct peaceful demonstrations

30. According to their latest reports and their briefings to the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012 in preparation for this report, group team leaders witnessed peaceful demonstrations by both Government supporters and the opposition in several places. None of those demonstrations were disrupted, except for some minor clashes with the Mission and between loyalists and opposition. These have not resulted in fatalities since the last presentation before the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria at its meeting of 8 January 2012.

31. The reports and briefings of groups leaders state that citizens belonging to the opposition surround the Mission on its arrival and use the gathering as a barrier from the security services. However, such incidents have gradually decreased.

32. The Mission has received requests from opposition supporters in Homs and Deraa that it should stay on-site and not leave, something that may be attributable to fear of attack after the Mission’s departure.

C. Verifying the release of those detained in the current incidents

33. The Mission received reports from parties outside Syria indicating that the number of detainees was 16,237. It also received information from the opposition inside the country that the number of detainees was 12,005. In validating those figures, the teams in the field discovered that there were discrepancies between the lists, that information was missing and inaccurate, and that names were repeated. The Mission is communicating with the concerned Government agencies to confirm those numbers.

34. The Mission has delivered to the Syrian Government all of the lists received from the Syrian opposition inside and outside Syria. In accordance with the protocol, it has demanded the release of the detainees.

35. On 15 January 2012, President Bashar Al-Assad issued a legislative decree granting a general amnesty for crimes perpetrated in the context of the events from 15 March 2011 through to the issuance of the decree. In implementation of the amnesty, the relevant Government authorities have been periodically releasing detainees in the various regions so long as they are not wanted in connection with other crimes. The Mission

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has been supervising the releases and is monitoring the process with the Government’s full and active coordination.

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36. On 19 January 2012, the Syrian government stated that 3569 detainees had been released from military and civil prosecution services. The Mission verified that 1669 of those detained had thus far been released. It continues to follow up the issue with the Government and the opposition, emphasizing to the Government side that the detainees should be released in the presence of observers so that the event can be documented.

37. The Mission has validated the following figures for the total number of detainees that the Syrian government thus far claims to have released:

• Before the amnesty: 4,035 • After the amnesty: 3,569.

The Government has therefore claimed that a total of 7,604 detainees have been released. 38. The Mission has verified the correct number of detainees released and arrived at the following figures: • Before the amnesty: 3,483 • After the amnesty: 1,669

The total number of confirmed releases is therefore 5152. The Mission is continuing to monitor the process and communicate with the Syrian Government for the release of the remaining detainees.

D. Confirming the withdrawal of the military presence from residential neighbourhoods in which demonstrations and protests occurred or are occurring

39. Based on the reports of the field-team leaders and the meeting held on 17 January 2012 with all team leaders, the Mission confirmed that all military vehicles, tanks and heavy weapons had been withdrawn from cities and residential neighbourhoods. Although there are still some security measures in place in the form of earthen berms and barriers in front of important buildings and in squares, they do not affect citizens. It should be noted that the Syrian Minister of Defence, in a meeting with the Head of the Mission that took place on 5 January 2012, affirmed his readiness to accompany the Head of the Mission to all sites and cities designated by the latter and from which the Mission suspects that the military presence had not yet been withdrawn, with a view to issuing field orders and rectifying any violation immediately.

40. Armoured vehicles (personnel carriers) are present at some barriers. One of those barriers is located in Homs and some others in Madaya, Zabadani and Rif Damascus. The presence of those vehicles was reported and they were subsequently withdrawn from Homs. It has been confirmed that the residents of Zabadani and Madaya reached a bilateral agreement with the Government that led to the removal of those barriers and vehicles.

E. Confirming the accreditation by the Syrian Government of Arab and international media organizations and that those organizations are allowed to move freely in all parts of Syria

41. Speaking on behalf of his Government, the Syrian Minister of Information confirmed that, from the beginning of December 2011 to 15 January 2012, the Government had accredited 147 Arab and foreign media organizations. Some 112 of those organizations entered Syrian territory, joining the 90 other accredited organizations operating in Syria through their full-time correspondents.

42. The Mission followed up on this issue. It identified 36 Arab and foreign media organizations and several journalists located in a number of Syrian cities. It also received complaints that the Syrian Government had granted some media organizations authorization to operate for four days only, which was insufficient time, according to those organizations. In addition to preventing them from entering the country until they had specified their destinations, journalists were required obtain further authorization once they had entered the country and were prevented from going to certain areas. The Syrian Government confirmed that it grants media organizations operating permits that are valid for 10 days, with the possibility of renewal.

43. Reports and information from some sectors [teams] indicate that the Government places restrictions on the movement of media organizations in opposition areas. In many cases, those restrictions caused journalists to trail the Mission in order to do their work.

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44. In Homs, a French journalist who worked for the France 2 channel was killed and a Belgian journalist was injured. The Government and opposition accused each other of being responsible for the incident, and both sides issued statements of condemnation. The Government formed an investigative committee in order to determine the cause of the incident. It should be noted that Mission reports from Homs indicate that the French journalist was killed by opposition mortar shells.

Annex 2. A list of media organizations identified and a list of media organizations that entered Syria, according to the official information.

VII.

A.

Obstacles encountered by the Mission Monitors Some of the experts nominated were not capable of taking on such a responsibility and did not have

45. prior experience in this field.

46. Some of the observers did not grasp the amount of responsibility that was being placed on them and the importance of giving priority to Arab interests over personal interests.

47. In the course of field work, some observers were unable to deal with difficult circumstances, which are at the core of their duties. Monitors must have certain traits and the specializations required for such work.

48. A number of the observers are elderly, and some of them suffer from health conditions that prevent them from performing their duties.

49. Twenty-two observers declined to complete the mission for personal reasons. Some observers offered unfounded reasons, which were not accepted by the Head of the Mission, while others had a personal agenda.

Annex 3. List of the names of observers who declined to complete the Mission.

50. Some observers reneged on their duties and broke the oath they had taken. They made contact with officials from their countries and gave them exaggerated accounts of events. Those officials consequently developed a bleak and unfounded picture of the situation.

51. Some of the observers in the various zones are demanding housing similar to their counterparts in Damascus or financial reimbursement equivalent to the difference in accommodation rates resulting from the difference in hotel standards or accommodation in Damascus. These issues do not warrant comment.

52. Some observers are afraid to perform their duties owing to the violent incidents that have occurred in certain locations. The unavailability of armoured cars at all the sites and the lack of bulletproof vests have negatively affected some observers’ ability to carry out their duties.

Comments of the Head of the Mission concerning the observers

53. Some of the observers, unfortunately, believed that their journey to Syria was for amusement, and were therefore surprised by the reality of the situation. They did not expect to be assigned to teams or to have to remain at stations outside the capital or to face the difficulties that they encountered.

54. Some of the observers were not familiar with the region and its geography. The unavailability of armoured vehicles and protective vests had a negative effect on the spirits of some observers.

55. Some of the observers experienced hostility both from the Syrian opposition and loyalists. This hostility also had a negative effect on their spirits.

56. Despite the foregoing comments, the performance of many of the observers was outstanding and praiseworthy. Those who underperformed will improve with experience and guidance.

B. Security restrictions

57. Although it welcomed the Mission and its Head and repeatedly emphasized that it would not impose any security restrictions that could obstruct the movement of the Mission, the Government deliberately attempted to limit the observers’ ability to travel extensively in various regions. The Government also attempted to focus the attention of the Mission on issues in which it is interested. The Mission resisted those attempts and responded to them in a manner that allowed it to fulfil its mandate and overcome the obstacles that stood in the way of its work.

C. Communication equipment

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58. The Mission communicates with the various groups by mobile phones and facsimile machines connected to the local Syrian telephone network. Occasional cuts in service prevent the Mission from communicating with the groups.

59. The Mission was equipped with 10 Thuraya satellite phones. Such devices are hard to use inside buildings owing of the difficulty in obtain a satellite signal. As a result, ordinary phones and fax machines, which are not considered secure communications equipment, were used to send daily reports, instead.

60. The communication equipment the Qatari observers brought with them was held at the Jordanian border, despite demands made by the Head of the Mission to the Syrian authorities to permit entry of that equipment. That notwithstanding, the amount of equipment would not have been enough to meet the needs of all sites and station.

61. The Mission does not have portable two-way radios for communication between team members. The Chinese Embassy provided 10 such radios as a gift to the Mission. They were used in three sectors only.

62. capital.

63. work in

D.

Internet service is unavailable in some regions, and in other areas it is intermittent, including in the

There are no cameras attached to the vehicles used by the Mission, which would facilitate observers’ dangerous areas.

Transportation

64. drive vehicles and 10 sedans. It should be noted that the Mission’s mandate requires the used of armoured four- wheel drive vehicles, given the nature of the Mission. The number of such vehicles currently available does not satisfy the needs of the Mission, particularly for transportation into trouble spots.

65. When it was first deployed, the Mission rented several cars from local sources for use in monitoring operations. However, owing to some acts of violence directed against the field teams, the rental companies recalled those vehicles and their drivers out of fear for their safety.

66. The Mission encountered difficulties in hiring drivers because the opposition groups refused to allowf local drivers to enter their areas because they believed the drivers were members of the security services, which forces the observers to drive the vehicles themselves.

67. Some of the observers demanded to use vehicles sent by their countries, a demand that was denied by the Head of the Mission, who allocated the vehicles according to the needs of each zone.

Annex 4. List showing the number, types and distribution of vehicles and the countries that provided them.

E. The media

68. Since it began its work, the Mission has been the target of a vicious media campaign. Some media outlets have published unfounded statements, which they attributed to the Head of the Mission. They have also grossly exaggerated events, thereby distorting the truth.

69. Such contrived reports have helped to increase tensions among the Syrian people and undermined the observers’ work. Some media organizations were exploited in order to defame the Mission and its Head and cause the Mission to fail.

VIII. Basic needs of the Mission, should its mandate be renewed

• 100 additional young observers, preferably military personnel • 30 armoured vehicles • Light protective vests • Vehicle-mounted photographic equipment

• Modern communications equipment • Binoculars, ordinary and night-vision IX. Evaluation:

The Mission has 38 cars at its disposal (23 armoured and 15 non-armoured), including 28 four-wheel

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70. The purpose of the Protocol is to protect Syrian citizens through the commitment of the Syrian Government to stop acts of violence, release detainees and withdraw all military presence from cities and residential neighbourhoods. This phase must lead to dialogue among the Syrian sides and the launching of a parallel political process. Otherwise, the duration of this Mission will be extended without achieving the desired results on the ground.

71. The Mission determined that there is an armed entity that is not mentioned in the protocol. This development on the ground can undoubtedly be attributed to the excessive use of force by Syrian Government forces in response to protests that occurred before the deployment of the Mission demanding the fall of the regime. In some zones, this armed entity reacted by attacking Syrian security forces and citizens, causing the Government to respond with further violence. In the end, innocent citizens pay the price for those actions with life and limb.

72. The Mission noted that the opposition had welcomed it and its members since their deployment to Syria. The citizens were reassured by the Mission’s presence and came forward to present their demands, although the opposition had previously been afraid to do so publicly owing to their fear of being arrested once again, as they had been prior to the Mission’s arrival in Syria. However, this was not case in the period that followed the last Ministerial Committee statement, although the situation is gradually improving.

73. The Mission noted that the Government strived to help it succeed in its task and remove any barriers that might stand in its way. The Government also facilitated meetings with all parties. No restrictions were placed on the movement of the Mission and its ability to interview Syrian citizens, both those who opposed the Government and those loyal to it.

74. In some cities, the Mission sensed the extreme tension, oppression and injustice from which the Syrian people are suffering. However, the citizens believe the crisis should be resolved peacefully through Arab mediation alone, without international intervention. Doing so would allow them to live in peace and complete the reform process and bring about the change they desire. The Mission was informed by the opposition, particularly in Dar‘a, Homs, Hama and Idlib, that some of its members had taken up arms in response to the suffering of the Syrian people as a result of the regime’s oppression and tyranny; corruption, which affects all sectors of society; the use of torture by the security agencies; and human rights violations.

75. Recently, there have been incidents that could widen the gap and increase bitterness between the parties. These incidents can have grave consequences and lead to the loss of life and property. Such incidents include the bombing of buildings, trains carrying fuel, vehicles carrying diesel oil and explosions targeting the police, members of the media and fuel pipelines. Some of those attacks have been carried out by the Free Syrian Army and some by other armed opposition groups.

76. The Mission has adhered scrupulously to its mandate, as set out in the Protocol. It has observed daily realities on the ground with complete neutrality and independence, thereby ensuring transparency and integrity in its monitoring of the situation, despite the difficulties the Mission encountered and the inappropriate actions of some individuals.

77. Under the Protocol, the Mission’s mandate is one month. This does not allow adequate time for administrative preparations, let alone for the Mission to carry out its task. To date, the Mission has actually operated for 23 days. This amount of time is definitely not sufficient, particularly in view of the number of items the Mission must investigate. The Mission needs to remain on the ground for a longer period of time, which would allow it to experience citizens’ daily living conditions and monitor all events. It should be noted that similar previous operations lasted for several months or, in some cases, several years.

78. Arab and foreign audiences of certain media organizations have questioned the Mission’s credibility because those organizations use the media to distort the facts. It will be difficult to overcome this problem unless there is political and media support for the Mission and its mandate. It is only natural that some negative incidents should occur as it conducts its activities because such incidents occur as a matter of course in similar missions.

79. The Mission arrived in Syria after the imposition of sanctions aimed at compelling to implement what was agreed to in the Protocol. Despite that, the Mission was welcomed by the opposition, loyalists and the Government. Nonetheless, questions remains as to how the Mission should fulfil its mandate. It should be noted that the mandate established for the Mission in the Protocol was changed in response to developments on the ground and the reactions thereto. Some of those were violent reactions by entities that were not mentioned

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in the Protocol. All of these developments necessitated an expansion of and a change in the Mission’s mandate. The most important point in this regard is the commitment of all sides to cease all acts of violence, thereby allowing the Mission to complete its tasks and, ultimately, lay the groundwork for the political process.

80. Should there be agreement to extend its mandate, then the Mission must be provided with communications equipment, means of transportation and all the equipment it requires to carry out its mandate on the ground.

81. On the other hand, ending the Mission’s work after such a short period will reverse any progress, even if partial, that has thus far been made. This could perhaps lead to chaos on the ground because all the parties involved in the crisis thus remain unprepared for the political process required to resolve the Syrian crisis.

82. Since its establishment, attitudes towards the Mission have been characterized by insincerity or, more broadly speaking, a lack of seriousness. Before it began carrying out its mandate and even before its members had arrived, the Mission was the target of a vicious campaign directed against the League of Arab States and the Head of the Mission, a campaign that increased in intensity after the observers’ deployment. The Mission still lack the political and media support it needs in order to fulfil its mandate. Should its mandate be extended, the goals set out in the Protocol will not be achieved unless such support is provided and the Mission receives the backing it needs to ensure the success of the Arab solution.

X. Recommendations:

83. In view of the above and of the success achieved in executing the provision of the Protocol, which the Syrian Government pledged to implement, I recommend the following:

• The Mission must be provided with administrative and logistic support in order allow it to carry out its tasks. The Mission must also be give the media and political support required to create an appropriate environment that will enable it to fulfil its mandate in the required manner.

• The political process must be accelerated and a national dialogue must be launched. That dialogue should run in parallel with the Mission’s work in order to create an environment of confidence that would contributes to the Mission’s success and prevent a needless extension of its presence in Syria.

Annexes

1. List of observers, their nationalities and their distribution.

2. List of media organizations identified and a list of media organizations that entered Syria, according to the official information.

3. List of the names of observers who declined to complete the Mission. 4. List showing the number, types and distribution of vehicles and the countries that provided them.