Suicidio saudita

por Thierry Meyssan

Arabia Saudita retomó el plan qatarí tendiente a derrocar el régimen laico en Siria pero Riad parece incapaz de adaptarse al brusco retroceso de Estados Unidos. No sólo rechaza el acuerdo ruso-estadounidense sino que incluso prosigue la guerra y está anunciando diversas represalias para «castigar» a Estados Unidos. En opinión de Thierry Meyssan, esa obstinación equivale a un suicidio colectivo de la familia Saud.

Abandonada en Siria por Estados Unidos, ¿se suicidará Arabia Saudita a falta de lograr llevarse la victoria? Eso es lo que puede pensarse al ver los siguientes acontecimientos:

El 30 de septiembre pasado, el príncipe Bandar Ben Sultan viajó a Rusia, donde no sólo fue recibido por su homólogo, el jefe de los servicios secretos, sino por el presidente Vladimir Putin. Hay dos versiones de ese encuentro. Según los sauditas, Bandar se expresó en nombre del reino y de Estados Unidos. Propuso comprar armamento ruso por una suma ascendente a 15 000 millones de dólares si Moscú abandonaba Siria. Según los rusos, Bandar se expresó con arrogancia, amenazando con el envío de yihadistas que pondrían en crisis la celebración de los Juegos Olímpicos de invierno en Sochi si Moscú persistía en su respaldo al régimen laico de Damasco y proponiendo un verdadero soborno. Sea cual sea la verdad, lo cierto es que el presidente Putin vio las palabras del príncipe saudita como un insulto a Rusia.

El pasado 30 de septiembre, el príncipe Saud Al-Faisal estaba inscrito como orador en el orden del día del debate general de 68ª Asamblea General de la ONU. Sin embargo, furioso ante el acercamiento entre Irán y Estados Unidos, este otro príncipe saudita –que funge como ministro de Relaciones Exteriores– simplemente abandonó la sede de la ONU, sin excusarse siquiera. Tan grande era su cólera que incluso se negó a que el discurso que iba a pronunciar, ya preparado e impreso de antemano, fuese distribuido a las delegaciones de los demás países.

El 11 de octubre, el secretario general adjunto de la ONU y ex responsable del Departamento de Estado para el Medio Oriente, Jeffrey Feltman, recibía a una delegación libanesa. Al hablar, en nombre del secretario general de la ONU Ban Ki-moon, Feltman no encontró palabras lo suficientemente duras para criticar la política exterior de Arabia Saudita, basada en «rencores» e incapaz de adaptarse a un mundo cambiante.

El 18 de octubre, la Asamblea General de la ONU elegía –193 votos a favor y 176 en contra– a Arabia Saudita para ocupar un puesto de miembro no permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad por un periodo de 2 años, que comenzaría el 1º de enero de 2014. El embajador saudita Abdallah El-Muallemi se felicitaba entonces por esa victoria que, según él, era un reflejo de «la eficacia de la política saudita caracterizada por la moderación» (sic). Sin embargo, unas pocas horas más tarde el príncipe Saud Al-Faisal publicaba un comunicado –de tono nasserista– sobre la incapacidad del Consejo de Seguridad y la negativa del reino a ocupar el puesto en ese órgano. Aunque mencionó el tema de Siria como motivo principal de esa decisión, el ministro saudita se dio el lujo de denunciar también la cuestión palestina y el tema de las armas de destrucción masiva en el Medio Oriente, o sea de designar simultáneamente como enemigos de la paz a Irán e Israel. Dado el hecho que la crítica contra la política de la ONU en Siria equivale a una denuncia directa contra Rusia y China, que recurrieron por 3 veces a su derecho de veto, el comunicado saudita era un insulto a Pekín, cuando China es actualmente el principal comprador del petróleo saudita. Ese viraje, que provocó consternación en las Naciones Unidas, fue sin embargo ruidosamente saludado por Turquía y Francia, países que dicen compartir la «frustración» de Arabia Saudita sobre el tema de Siria.

El 21 de octubre, el Wall Street Journal revelaba que el príncipe Bandar Ben Sultan había invitado varios diplomáticos europeos acreditados en Riad a visitarlo en su domicilio, donde les narró el furor saudita ante el acercamiento entre Irán y Estados Unidos y el retroceso estadounidense en Siria. Ante sus atónitos interlocutores, el jefe de los servicios secretos sauditas anunció que el reino piensa vengarse retirando sus inversiones de Estados Unidos. Retomando el episodio del asiento en el Consejo de Seguridad, el Wall Street Journal precisó que –según el príncipe Bandar– el comunicado no estaba dirigido contra la actitud de Pekín sino contra Washington, precisión que resulta tanto más interesante cuanto que no corresponde a la situación.

Ante la incredulidad que suscitaron esas declaraciones y los comentarios conciliadores del Departamento de Estado, el príncipe saudita Turki Ben Faisal explicó a la agencia Reuters que su enemigo personal Bandar había hablado en nombre del reino y que esa nueva política no será objeto de revisión. Lo cual quiere decir que no existen divergencias al respecto entre las dos ramas rivales de la familia reinante en Arabia Saudita –los Sudairi y los Shuraim– sino una visión común que comparten los dos bandos.

En resumen, Arabia Saudita insultó a Rusia en julio pasado, insultó a China hace 2 semanas. Y ahora insulta a Estados Unidos. El reino anuncia que va a retirar sus inversiones de este último país, probablemente para volverse hacia Turquía y Francia, aunque ningún experto ve cómo pudiera ser eso posible. Ese comportamiento puede tener dos explicaciones: Riad finge cólera para que Washington pueda continuar la guerra en Siria sin responsabilizarse con ella o la familia Saud está cometiendo un suicidio político.

La primera hipótesis parece estar en contradicción con las palabras de Bandar ante los embajadores europeos. Si estuviese jugando a favor de Estados Unidos por debajo de la mesa, el jefe de los servicios secretos sauditas tendría especial cuidado en no ponerse a predicar revoluciones a sus aliados.

La segunda hipótesis recuerda el comportamiento de los camellos, animal preferido de los beduinos sauditas. Esos cuadrúpedos tienen la reputación de alimentar sus rencores durante largos años y de ser incapaces de vivir en paz mientras no hayan logrado concretar su venganza, sea cual sea el precio a pagar por ello.

Pero Riad parece haber olvidado que la supervivencia de Arabia Saudita está en juego desde que John O. Brennan fue nombrado director de la CIA, en marzo de 2013. Brennan, quien estuvo destacado en Arabia Saudita, es un resuelto adversario del dispositivo que sus predecesores montaron en el pasado con Riad: el yihadismo internacional. Brennan estima que si bien esos elementos hicieron un buen trabajo en su momento –en Afganistán, Yugoslavia y Chechenia–, hoy se han hecho demasiado numerosos e incontrolables. Lo que empezó siendo una banda de extremistas árabes enviados a combatir contra el Ejército Rojo se ha convertido con el tiempo en una constelación de grupos, presentes desde Marruecos hasta China, que hoy luchan más con la perspectiva de imponer el modelo de sociedad saudita que para vencer a los adversarios de Estados Unidos.

Ya en 2001, Estados Unidos había planeado liquidar al-Qaeda atribuyéndole los atentados del 11 de septiembre. Pero, con el asesinato oficial de Osama ben Laden en mayo de 2011, Washington prefirió rehabilitar esa red y la utilizó profusamente en Libia y en Siria. Sin al-Qaeda nunca hubiese sido posible el derrocamiento de Muammar el-Kadhafi, como ha quedado demostrado con la llegada de Abdelhakim Belhaj –ex número 2 de al-Qaeda en Libia– al cargo de gobernador militar de Trípoli. Según la visión de Brennan, es necesario reducir el yihadismo a su mínima expresión y conservarlo únicamente para su uso como fuerza de apoyo de la CIA en ciertas circunstancias.

El yihadismo no sólo es la única fuerza efectiva de Arabia Saudita, cuyo ejército se divide en dos unidades que obedecen cada una a uno de los clanes de la familia Saud, sino que además se ha convertido en la única razón de ser del reino en la medida en que Washington ya no necesita a Arabia Saudita para que le garantice el petróleo ni tampoco para que predique la causa de la paz con Israel. Lo anterior explica el regreso del Pentágono al viejo plan de los neoconservadores: «Expulsar de Arabia a los Saud», según el título de un PowerPoint proyectado en julio de 2002 a los miembros del Consejo Político del Departamento de Defensa. Ese proyecto prevé el desmantelamiento de Arabia Saudita en 5 zonas, 3 de las cuales estarían llamadas a convertirse en Estados independientes entre sí mientras que las otras 2 pasarían a formar parte de otros países.

Al optar por probar fuerza con Estados Unidos, la familia Saud no deja opción a los estadounidenses. Es poco probable que Washington permita que unos cuantos beduinos adinerados le digan lo que tiene que hacer, lo cual hace muy previsible que decida meterlos en cintura. En 1975, Washington no vaciló en ordenar el asesinato del rey Faisal. Esta vez, es muy probable que actúe de forma aún más radical.

¿Obama y Putin se quieren repartir OM?

por Thierry Meyssan

Dans un article publié le 26 janvier dernier en Russie, Thierry Meyssan expose le nouveau plan de partage du Proche-Orient sur lequel travaillent la Maison-Blanche et le Kremlin. L’auteur y révèle les principales données de la négociation en cours sans préjuger d’un accord définitif, ni de sa mise en œuvre. L’intérêt de l’article est qu’il permet de comprendre les positions ambigües de Washington qui pousse ses alliés dans une impasse de manière à pouvoir leur imposer prochainement une nouvelle donne dont ils seront exclus.

Le président Obama s’apprête à changer complètement de stratégie internationale, malgré l’opposition que son projet a suscité dans sa propre administration.

Le constat est simple. Les États-Unis sont en passe de devenir indépendants au plan énergétique grâce à l’exploitation rapide des gaz de schistes et du pétrole des sables bitumineux. Par conséquent la doctrine Carter (1980) selon laquelle la sécurisation de l’accès au pétrole du Golfe est un impératif de sécurité nationale est morte. De même d’ailleurs que l’Accord du Quincy (1945) selon lequel Washington s’engage à protéger la dynastie des Séoud si ceux-ci leur garantissent l’accès au pétrole de la péninsule arabique. Le temps est venu d’un retrait massif qui permettra de transférer les GI’s vers l’Extrême-Orient afin de contenir l’influence chinoise.

D’autre part, tout doit être fait pour empêcher une alliance militaire sino-russe. Il convient donc d’offrir des débouchés à la Russie qui la détournent de l’Extrême-Orient.

Enfin, Washington étouffe de sa relation trop étroite avec Israël. Celle-ci est extrêmement onéreuse, injustifiable au plan international, et dresse contre les États-Unis l’ensemble des populations musulmanes. En outre, il convient de sanctionner clairement Tel-Aviv qui s’est ingéré de manière ahurissante dans la campagne électorale présidentielle US, qui plus est en misant contre le candidat qui a gagné.

C’est trois éléments ont conduit Barack Obama et ses conseillers à proposer un pacte à Vladimir Poutine : Washington, qui reconnaît implicitement avoir échoué en Syrie, est prêt à laisser la Russie s’installer au Proche-Orient sans contrepartie, et à partager avec elle le contrôle de cette région.

C’est dans cet état d’esprit qu’a été rédigé par Kofi Annan le Communiqué de Genève
du 30 juin 2012. À l’époque, il s’agissait juste de trouver une issue à la question syrienne. Mais cet accord a été immédiatement saboté par des éléments internes de l’administration Obama. Ils ont laissé fuiter à la presse européenne divers éléments sur la guerre secrète en Syrie, y compris l’existence d’un Presidential Executive Order enjoignant la CIA de déployer ses hommes et des mercenaires sur le terrain. Pris en tenaille, Kofi Annan avait démissionné de ses fonctions de médiateur. De son côté, la Maison-Blanche avait fait profil bas pour ne pas exposer ses divisions en pleine campagne pour la réélection de Barack Obama.

Dans l’ombre trois groupes s’opposaient au communiqué de Genève :
• Les agents impliqués dans la guerre secrète ;
• Les unités militaires chargées de contrer la Russie
• Les relais d’Israël.

Au lendemain de son élection, Barack Obama a débuté la grande purge. La première victime fut le général David Petraeus, concepteur de la guerre secrète en Syrie. Tombé dans un piège sexuel tendu par une agente du Renseignement militaire, le directeur de la CIA fut contraint à la démission. Puis, une douzaine de hauts gradés furent mis sous enquête pour corruption. Parmi eux, le suprême commandeur de l’OTAN (amiral James G. Stravidis) et son successeur désigné (le général John R. Allen), ainsi que le commandant de la Missile Défense Agency —c’est-à-dire du « Bouclier anti-missiles »— ¬(général Patrick J. O’Reilly). Enfin, Susan Rice et Hillary Clinton faisaient l’objet de vives attaques pour avoir caché au Congrès des éléments sur la mort de l’ambassadeur Chris Stevens, assassiné à Benghazi par un groupe islamiste probablement commandité par le Mossad.

Ses différentes oppositions internes étant pulvérisées ou paralysées, Barack Obama a annoncé un renouvellement en profondeur de son équipe. D’abord, John Kerry au département d’État. L’homme est partisan déclaré d’une collaboration avec Moscou sur les sujets d’intérêt commun. Il est aussi un ami personnel de Bachar el-Assad. Puis, Chuck Hagel au département de la Défense. C’est un des piliers de l’OTAN, mais un réaliste. Il a toujours dénoncé la mégalomanie des néo-conservateurs et leur rêve d’impérialisme global. C’est un nostalgique de la Guerre froide, ce temps béni où Washington et Moscou se partageaient le monde à moindres frais. Avec son ami Kerry, Hagel avait organisé en 2008 une tentative de négociation pour la restitution par Israël du plateau du Golan à la Syrie. Enfin John Brennan à la CIA. Ce tueur de sang-froid est convaincu que la première faiblesse des États-Unis, c’est d’avoir créé et développé le jihadisme international. Son obsession est d’éliminer le salafisme et l’Arabie saoudite, ce qui en définitive soulagerait la Russie au Nord-Caucasse.

Simultanément, la Maison-Blanche a poursuivi ses tractations avec le Kremlin. Ce qui devait être une simple solution pour la Syrie est devenu un projet bien plus vaste de réorganisation et de partage du Proche-Orient.

On se souvient qu’en 1916, à l’issue de 8 mois de négociations, le Royaume-Uni et la France se partagèrent en secret le Proche-Orient (Accords Sykes-Picot). Le contenu de ces accords avait été révélé au monde par les Bolcheviks dès leur arrivée au pouvoir. Il s’est poursuivi durant près d’un siècle. Ce que l’administration Obama envisage, c’est un remodelage du Proche-Orient pour le XXIe siècle, sous l’égide des USA et de la Russie.

Aux États-Unis, bien qu’Obama se succède à lui-même, il ne peut dans la période actuelle qu’expédier les affaires courantes. Il ne reprendra ses attributions complètes que lors de sa prestation de serment, le 21 janvier. Dans les jours qui suivront, le Sénat auditionnera Hillary Clinton sur le mystère de l’assassinat de l’ambassadeur en Libye (23 janvier), puis il auditionnera John Kerry pour confirmer sa nomination (24 janvier). Immédiatement après, les 5 membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité se réuniront à New York pour examiner les propositions Lavrov-Burns sur la Syrie.

Celles-ci prévoient la condamnation de toute ingérence extérieure, le déploiement d’observateurs et d’une force de paix des Nations Unies, un appel aux différents protagonistes pour qu’ils forment un gouvernement d’union nationale et planifient des élections. La France devrait s’y opposer sans pour autant menacer d’utiliser son veto contre son suzerain US.

L’originalité du plan, c’est que la force des Nations Unies serait principalement composée par des soldats de l’Organisation du Traité de Sécurité Collective (OTSC). Le président Bachar el-Assad resterait au pouvoir. Il négocierait rapidement une Charte nationale avec des leaders de l’opposition non-armée sélectionnés avec l’approbation de Moscou et Washington, et ferait valider cette charte par référendum sous contrôle des observateurs.

Ce coup de théâtre a été préparé de longue date par les généraux Hassan Tourekmani (assassiné le 18 juillet 2012) et Nikolay Bordyuzha. Une position commune des ministres des Affaires étrangères de l’OTSC a été conclue le 28 septembre et un Protocole a été signé entre le département onusien de maintien de la paix et l’OTSC. Celle-ci dispose maintenant des mêmes prérogatives que l’OTAN. Des manœuvres communes ONU/OTSC de simulation ont été organisées au Kazakhstan sous le titre « Fraternité inviolable » (8 au 17 octobre). Enfin, un plan de déploiement de « chapkas bleues » a été discuté au sein du Comité militaire de l’ONU (8 décembre).

Une fois la Syrie stabilisée, une conférence internationale devrait se tenir à Moscou pour une paix globale entre Israël et ses voisins. Les États-Unis considèrent qu’il n’est pas possible de négocier une paix séparée entre Israël et la Syrie, car les Syriens exigent d’abord une solution pour la Palestine au nom de l’arabisme. Mais il n’est pas possible non plus de négocier une paix avec les Palestiniens, car ceux-ci sont extrêmement divisés, à moins que la Syrie ne soit chargée de les contraindre à respecter un accord majoritaire. Par conséquent, toute négociation doit être globale sur le modèle de la conférence de Madrid (1991). Dans cette hypothèse, Israël se retirerait autant que faire se peut sur ses frontières de 1967. Les Territoires palestiniens et la Jordanie fusionneraient pour former l’État palestinien définitif. Son gouvernement serait confié aux Frères musulmans ce qui rendrait la solution acceptable aux yeux des gouvernements arabes actuels. Puis, le plateau du Golan serait restitué aux Syriens en échange de l’abandon du lac de Tibériade, selon le schéma envisagé jadis aux négociations de Shepherdstown (1999). La Syrie deviendrait garante du respect des traités par la partie jordano-palestinienne.

Comme dans un jeu de domino, on en viendrait alors à la question kurde. L’Irak serait démantelé pour donner naissance à un Kurdistan indépendant et la Turquie serait appelée à devenir un État fédéral accordant une autonomie à sa région kurde.

Côté US, on souhaiterait prolonger le remodelage jusqu’à sacrifier l’Arabie saoudite devenue inutile. Le pays serait divisé en trois, tandis que certaines provinces seraient rattachées soit à la fédération jordano-palestinienne, soit à l’Irak chiite, conformément à un vieux plan du Pentagone ("Taking Saudi out of Arabia", 10 juillet 2002). Cette option permettrait à Washington de laisser un vaste champ d’influence à Moscou sans avoir à sacrifier une partie de sa propre influence. Le même comportement avait été observé au FMI lorsque Washington a accepté d’augmenter le droit de vote des BRICS. Les États-Unis n’ont rien cédé de leur pouvoir et ont contraint les Européens à renoncer à une partie de leurs votes pour faire de la place aux BRICS.

Cet accord politico-militaire se double d’un accord économico-énergétique, le véritable enjeu de la guerre contre la Syrie étant pour la plupart des protagonistes la conquête de ses réserves de gaz. De vastes gisements ont en effet été découverts au Sud de la Méditerranée et en Syrie. En positionnant ses troupes dans le pays, Moscou s’assurerait un plus large contrôle sur le marché du gaz dans les années à venir.

Le cadeau de la nouvelle administration Obama à Vladimir Poutine se double de plusieurs calculs. Non seulement détourner la Russie de l’Extrême-Orient, mais aussi l’utiliser pour neutraliser Israël. Si un million d’Israéliens ont la double nationalité états-unienne, un autre million est russophone. Installées en Syrie, les troupes russes dissuaderaient les Israéliens d’attaquer les Arabes et les Arabes d’attaquer Israël. Par conséquent, les États-Unis ne seraient plus obligés de dépenser des sommes phénoménales pour la sécurité de la colonie juive.

La nouvelle donne obligerait les États-Unis à reconnaître enfin le rôle régional de l’Iran. Cependant Washington souhaiterait obtenir des garanties que Téhéran se retire d’Amérique latine où il a tissé de nombreux liens, notamment avec le Venezuela. On ignore la réaction iranienne à cet aspect du dispositif, mais Mahmoud Ahmadinejad s’est d’ores et déjà empressé de faire savoir à Barack Obama qu’il ferait tout ce qui est en son possible pour l’aider à prendre ses distances avec Tel-Aviv.

Ce projet a des perdants. D’abord la France et le Royaume-Uni dont l’influence s’efface. Puis Israël, privé de son influence aux États-Unis et ramené à sa juste proportion de petit État. Enfin L’Irak, démantelé. Et peut-être l’Arabie saoudite qui se débat depuis quelques semaines pour se réconcilier avec les uns et les autres afin d’échapper au sort qui lui est promis. Il a aussi ses gagnants. D’abord Bachar el-Assad, hier traité de criminel contre l’humanité par les Occidentaux, et demain glorifié comme vainqueur des islamistes. Et surtout Vladimir Poutine qui, par sa ténacité tout au long du conflit, parvient à faire sortir la Russie de son « containment », à lui rouvrir la Méditerranée et le Proche-Orient et à faire reconnaître sa prééminence sur le marché du gaz.

Más propaganda: Kony2012

Kony 2012, hyped on the backs of celebrities and do-gooders, is revealed for what it is– a propaganda salvo for a continent wide invasion of Africa. Yes, the mantra War is Peace is once again drumming U.S. soldiers into further conflict.

Research makes clear that KONY is a sophisticated psy-op to muster popular support for what is, in reality, nothing more than a geostrategic positioning vis-a-vis China for oil and mineral resources, as well as an effort to legitimize the U.S. military’s AFRICOM unit in the region through newly-branded “humanitarian” interventions.

It is not only War in the name of “Peace,” but an attempt to empower the International Criminal Court under the influence of NGOs and other related globalist corporate interests.

Nobel Peace Prize “winner” Barack Obama has already deployed 100 special forces troops to the central African region back in October 2011, and a resolution in Congress– on the heels of KONY 2012′s viral views of at lest 80 million– seeks to send more forces there for an all out invasion on the pretext of hunting down a shadowy warlord with less blood on his hands than an average African despot.

Top celebrities vying for greater power including CFR member and UN goodwill ambassadorAngelina Jolie, actor George Clooney, media baroness Oprah Winfrey, as well as Africa-obsessed Bill Gates and Bono, have all come out in front of this issue.

But behind KONY’s apparent urgency are the usual suspects, the hidden hands behind uprisings and color revolutions including the Arab Spring and Libyan invasion. A key World Net Daily investigation makes clear that George Soros and his International Crisis Group, headed by former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the likes of Samantha Power, a key member of Obama’s National Security Council advancing “humanitarian” causes, have significantly framed and shaped the manufactured crisis surrounding the now-famous head of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Like Libya, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine– created and advanced by Soros, Samantha Power and other power players– gives the impetus for intervention in the conflict. Groups like Invisible Children, who produced KONY 2012, are pawns in their game.

La misma propaganda aplicada para Siria

By Patrick Henningsen At infowars.com

We can already see exact parallels with the current PR operation to bring down Syria with how Libya went down. In one case, published today, it seems that an award-winning newspaper have been caught red-handed running faux news on Syria - and incredibly, it’s not the first time this exact story has been used.

This morning, reporter Alastair Beach of The Independent newspaper based in London, cited “evidence” that Syrian President Assad’s security forces have indiscriminately killed scores of newborn babies in Homs this week, as his featured article states:


“Bashar al-Assad’s bloody siege of Homs intensified yesterday as clear evidence emerged that his indiscriminate shelling of the restive town had started claiming innocent victims, including at least 18 premature babies and three entire families. The evidence came as civilians in the besieged city endured a fifth day of incessant shellfire – the worst yet, according to eyewitnesses – with dozens of other people being killed as the brutal assault continued.”

Writer Beach’s source for his claims seem to originate from only one organization, not in Syria – but in London. Surprisingly, the Independent’s chief source for the alleged horrors in question is a nearly invisible organization known as the ”Syrian Observatory for Human Rights”(SOHR), who claim to have an office based in London, but apparently have no address or contact phone number listed - only and email address. Even murkier however, is that fact that there are no names associated with the SOHR on their website, and many of its articles have been written under the fictitious pen name known as “Rami Abdul Rahman“.

It’s likely that “Rami Abdul Rahman” is in fact one Rami Abdelrahman, depicted in other online press coverage as head of the SOHR although he is not listed as a contact person on the organization’s website, and is reported to have met with Britain’s Foreign Secretary,William Hague at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on November 21, 2011.

One can only conclude that with no names or contact information, the SOHR is – by definition- a very well-hidden, clandestine lobbying organization, and in this case, it appears to be lobbying for regime change in Syria, from inside Britain’s Foreign Office.

Before regime change in Tripoli, the US, France and Britain relied on the likes of Soliman Bouchuiguir, the former Libyan League for Human Rights president with ties to NATO’s National Transitional Council (NTC), helped to generate numerous lies needed by the west to justify NATO’s now famously titled “humanitarian intervention” – allegedly to protect Libyans. This human rights impostor – like his present day Syrian counterpart Rami Abdelrahman who may very well have ties to the Paris-based rebel coalition known as Syrian National Council (SNC), made then Colonel Moumar Gaddafi a targeted by spreading lies alleged state crimes, but with with no evidence, as outlined in documents released last October by the publication Voltaire. Syria’s President Assad is currently undergoing the exact same treatment, and in the exact same manner.

Babies in incubators: a recycled media hoax

Amazingly, this exact same story was also making the rounds recently in August of 2011,when a similar claim was busy circulating online through various social networks including Twitter in Arabic - the same tale of premature babies who died in their incubators when Syrian forces cut off electricity to hospitals during their assault on the city of Hama.

Even though it admits that it could not independently verify the account, CNN still went and ran with the SOHR rumor, broadcasting: ”Rights Group: 8 babies die after power cut to Syrian hospital“.

Electronic Infidada reported on the August 2011 recent hoax: “Evidence suggests it is a cruel hoax, and the pictures of the “dead babies” widely circulated online are false.” They outlined parallels between the August faux story as past regime change PR campaigns:


“URGENT – Syria | The electricity was cut today from the city of Hama, and the outage included the hospitals. Following this, the Shabiha [state militia] deliberately destroyed the electricity generators in the hospitals which led to the deaths of all the premature babies (more than 40 in a single hospital).”


To me the story was immediately suspicious. First of all it sounded too much like the false reports of invading Iraqi troops throwing babies out of incubators in Kuwait in August 1990— reports that were used to build public support and urgency for the 1991 Gulf War. These claims were part of an elaborate propaganda effort by the Washington PR consultancy Hill & Knowlton hired by the Kuwaiti government.

The fact that an award-winning newspaper like the UK’s Independent would use such a shadowy outfit to support one of its most shocking headlined stories on the crisis in Syria – is also surprising in itself. The biggest problem with both seperate accounts of dying babies in incubators – put forward by the SOHR and circulated in the corporate media by the likes of The Independent and CNN, is that at no point along the line, has the SOHR been held accountable for what are patently unsubstantiated claims.

Lobbying groups and their governments in-exile are traditionally the source of anti-regime “heart-string” reports which have in the past have been passed on for broadcast by major media outlets, which naturally follows with favoring pre-emptive military strike, or as recently seen with Libya – a ‘humanitarian intervention’.

The illusion of unspeakable atrocities is of paramount concern in both the US and in Europe because convincing the Left-leaning elements of the public and in government brings with it a green light for any military intervention.

consumers of the press in the west are likely to be force fed- yet again, another endless diet of false claims designed to sway public opinion in favor of military action by NATO or NATO-backed allies in Syria, and later in Iran.

Journalist Tony Cartalucci reported back in December regarding the clandestine activities of SOHR, adding:


It is quite clear that the “Syrian Observatory for Human Rights” based in London and receiving the entirety of their reports via “phone” & YouTube videos from Syria, is working in coordination with both US-funded NGOs and the British Foreign Minister. Considering that Hague similarly coddled Libyan opposition leaders in London while playing a key role in promoting the NATO attack on Libya and the subsequent installation of a BP oilman as “prime minister,” Abdelrahman’s consorting signifies a verbatim repeat of the now openly fraudulent and genocidal NATO campaign in Libya.

Just as in Libya, where “human rights activists” have now admitted to fabricating the evidence used by the International Criminal Court and the United Nations to rubber stamp Wall Street and London’s designs for regime change, likewise the “evidence” from Syria has turned out to be a complete fraud, derived by opposition “witnesses” and compiled by a corporate D.C. think-tank director into a UN “human rights report.”

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights serves as the exclusive source of “reports” coming out of Syria despite the fact that it is actually, entirely based in London. While it is verified that the NGOs it works in tandem with are US-funded, the Observatory itself fails to publish where its money comes from or the backgrounds of those that constitute its membership. We then, are expected to simply believe on face value a mysterious organization whose head meets with the British government and their unverified “witness accounts” as evidence to initiate military intervention at the cost of potentially millions of lives.

The UN based the whole premise for its Security Council Resolution 1973 for Libya on reports from western-backed Libyan rebels. Their wild claims included – unbelievably and highly reported by the western media - that Gaddafi lead jet attacks on his own people, and killed more than 6000 unarmed protester cum civilians. This jet claim was needed in order to get aNo Fly Zone included in resolution 1973.

During the run-up to their vote on the matter, it is clear now that absolutely no due diligence was carried out by any of the UN member states, which stands to reason that the whole UN affair form beginning to end, was planned and executed as a political decision - hardly a humanitarian concern.

We can see how the corporate media will knowingly run sensationalist, unverified accounts of human rights accounts in countries like Libya and Syria, but what about out elected leaders? Will they too run with these same wild claims in order to make their public case for war? No doubt. Members of the NATO governments have also been assigned their roles in making intervention possible. Britain’s William Hague seems to be running point on the PR campaign for regime change in Syria. Following Russia and China’s veto of the UN’s recent revolution for action in Syria, Hague condemned the decision – and used wild, unverified statistics most likely gleaned from his friend at the SOHR, as reported by the Guardian:


“More than 2,000 people have died since Russia and China vetoed the last draft resolution in October 2011,” he said after the vote. “How many more need to die before Russia and China allow the UN security council to act?”

Here we are again, at another crossroads, so soon after the last one. And like clockwork, the same patterns are emerging to sway western public opinion, this time against President Assad and his Syrian government.

Infowars.com have already attempted to contact SOHR via their email address, in order to receive further clarification as to the source of their recent claims that Assad’s security forces are responsible for the death of 18 newborn babies, but have yet to receive any response from the London-based organization.

El informe completo de la misión en Siria: censurado por Qatar y por los medios occidentales

Este es el informe completo donde queda claro lo que ocurre en Siria, en contradicción con lo que dice la prensa del imperio, atlantista, y del golfo.

Que no nos engañen, derrocar el gobierno sirio es el único objetivo. Y si hace falta matar a civiles, así será.

Bienvenidos a las nuevas técnicas de la CIA.


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League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria

Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

“We offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to carry it, and were afraid of it; and man carried it. Surely he is sinful, very foolish” [Qur’an 33:72]

I . Legal bases

1. By resolution 7436 of 2 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted the Arab plan of action annexed thereto, welcomed the Syrian Government’s agreement to the plan, and emphasized the need for the Syrian Government to commit to the full and immediate implementation of its provisions.

2. On 16 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted resolution 7439 approving the draft protocol of the Legal Centre and the mandate of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria, namely to verify implementation of the provisions of the Arab plan of action to resolve the Syrian crisis and protect Syrian civilians. The resolution requested the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to take such steps as he deemed appropriate to appoint the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission and to make contact with the Syrian Government with a view to signing the Protocol.

3. By resolution 7441 of 24 November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States requested the Secretary-General of the League to deploy the Observer Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic in order to fulfil its mandate under the protocol immediately on its signature.

4. The Syrian Arab Republic and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States signed the protocol on 19 December 2011. The protocol provided for the establishment and deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic of a Mission comprising civilian and military experts from Arab countries and Arab non- governmental human rights organizations. Paragraph 5 stated that the Mission should transmit regular reports on the results of its work to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab State and the Syrian Government for submission — via the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria — to the Council of the League at the ministerial level for its consideration and appropriate action.

5. On 20 December 2011, the Council of the League approved the appointment of General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi from the Republic of the Sudan as Head of the Observer Mission.

II. Formation of the Mission

6. The General Secretariat requested Member States and relevant Arab organizations to transmit the names of its candidates for the Mission. On that basis, 166 monitors from 13 Arab countries and six relevant Arab organizations have thus far been appointed.

III. Visit of the advance delegation of the General Secretariat to Syria

7. In preparation for the Mission, an advance delegation of the General Secretariat visited the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 December 2011 to discuss the logistical preparations for the Mission.

8. In accordance with the protocol, the Syrian Government confirmed its readiness to facilitate the Mission in every way by allowing the free and safe movement of all of the observers throughout Syria, and by refraining from hindering the work of the Mission on security or administrative grounds. The Syrian Government side also affirmed its commitment to ensuring that the Mission could freely conduct the necessary meetings; to provide full protection for the observers, taking into consideration the responsibility of the Mission if it were to insist on visiting areas despite the warning of the security services; and to allow the entry to Syria of journalists and Arab and international media in accordance with the rules and regulations in force in the country.

VI. Arrival and preliminary visits of the Head of Mission

9. The Head of the Mission, General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi, arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on the evening of Saturday 24 December 2011. He held a series of meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Walid Al-Moualem, and with Syrian Government officials, who stated that they stood

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prepared to cooperate fully with the Mission and to endeavour to ensure its success, overcoming any obstacles that may arise. The necessary logistical and security arrangements were agreed.

10. The Syrian side stated that there were certain areas that the security protection detail would not be able to enter with the observers for fear of the citizens’ reaction. The Head of the Mission replied that that situation would enable the Mission to engage with citizens and opposition parties without government monitoring, thereby removing the citizens’ fear of repercussions as a result of communicating with the Mission.

11. The Head of the Mission completed the technical field preparations and secured the necessary transportation and communication devices in order to start work. He met with the observers who arrived successively in Syria and briefed them on their duties and the bases of their work under the protocol. The observers took a special oath for the Mission which had been drafted by the Head.

12. On 27 December 2011, the Head of the Mission and ten observers conducted a preliminary visit to the city of Homs, one of the epicentres of tension, which has seen acts of violence and armed confrontation between the Army and the Syrian opposition. Some security barriers separating districts remain in place.

13. Immediately on arriving in Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Governor of the city, who explained that there had been an escalation in violence perpetrated by armed groups in the city. There had been instances of kidnapping and sabotage of Government and civilian facilities. Food was in short supply owing to the blockade imposed by armed groups, which were believed to include some 3000 individuals. The Governor further stated that all attempts by religious figures and city notables to calm the situation had failed. He made enquiries regarding the possibility of addressing the issue of soldiers and vehicles blocked inside Baba Amr.

14. The Mission visited the residential districts of Baba Amr, Karam Al-Zaytun, Al-Khalidiyya and Al- Ghuta without guards. It met with a number of opposition citizens who described the state of fear, blockade and acts of violence to which they had been subjected by Government forces. At a time of intense exchanges of gunfire among the sides, the Mission witnessed the effects of the destruction wrought on outlying districts. The Mission witnessed an intense exchange of gunfire between the Army and opposition in Baba Amr. It saw four military vehicles in surrounding areas, and therefore had to return to the Governorate headquarters. It was agreed with the Governor that five members of the Mission would remain in Homs until the following day to conduct field work and meet with the greatest possible number of citizens.

15. Immediately on returning from Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Government and insisted that it withdraw military vehicles from the city, put an end to acts of violence, protect civilians, lift the blockade and provide food. He further called for the two sides to exchange the bodies of those killed.

16. At that meeting, the Syrian side agreed to withdraw all military presence from the city and residential areas except for three army vehicles that were not working and had been surrounded, and one that had been taken from the Army by armed groups. The Syrian side requested the Mission’s assistance to recover and remove those vehicles in exchange for the release of four individuals, the exchange of five bodies from each side, the entry of basic foods for families in the city, and the entry of sanitation vehicles to remove garbage. It was agreed at the end of the meeting that the Mission would conduct another visit to Homs on the following day in the company of General Hassan Sharif, the security coordinator for the Government side.

17. During that visit, the Mission was introduced to one of the leading figures in the opposition, who acted as media representative of the National Council. An extensive discussion took place regarding the offer of the Syrian Government and the best way to implement the agreement. As a result, the military vehicles were returned and removed; the bodies of those killed were exchanged; trucks entered the city with food; and three detainees and two women were released and returned to their families in the presence of the Mission, thereby calming the situation inside the city.

18. Five days after the monitors were deployed to five zones, the Ministerial Committee requested that the Head of the Mission report on the Mission’s work. He travelled to Cairo and gave an oral presentation to the members of the Committee at their meeting of 8 January 2012. It was decided that the work of the Mission should continue and that the Head of the Mission should submit a report at the end of the period determined in the protocol, on 19 January 2012. After the Head's return to Damascus to resume his duties, the Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists and opposition alike, particularly as a result of statements and media coverage in the wake of the Committee meeting. That did not, however, affect the work of the Mission or its full and smooth deployment across the country.

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19. Following its arrival, and to this date, the Mission has received numerous letters from the Syrian committee responsible for coordination with the Mission. The letters refer to the material and human losses sustained by Government institutions and offices as a result of what is described as sabotage. They assert that all of the States’ vital services have been affected.

V. Deployment of the Observer Mission to Syria

20. The observers were divided into 15 zones covering 20 cities and districts across Syria according to the time frame set out below. The variation in dates was a result of shortcomings in administrative and technical preparations, such as the arrival of cars and personnel. Care was taken to ensure even distribution of observers. Each unit comprised some ten observers of different Arab nationalities. The groups were deployed to Syrian governorates and towns as follows:

• On 29 December 2011, six groups travelled to Damascus, Homs, Rif Homs, Idlib, Deraa and Hama.

• On 4 January 2012, a group travelled to Aleppo.

• On 9 January 2012, two groups went to Deir Al-Zor and Latakia. However, both returned to Damascus on 10 January 2012 owing to attacks that led to the injury of two of the monitors in Latakia and material damage to the cars.

• On 10 January 2012, a group travelled to Qamishli and Hasaka.

• On 12 January 2012, a group travelled to Outer Damascus.

• On 13 January 2012, four groups travelled to Suwaida, Bu Kamal, Deir Al-Zor, Palmyra (Tadmur), Sukhna, Banyas and Tartous.

• On 15 January 2012, two groups travelled to Latakia, Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra. Annex 1. List of observers, their nationalities and their distribution.

21.

• • • • •

The observers were provided with the following: A map of the region; A code of conduct for observers; The duties of the group leaders; The duties of the observers; Necessary equipment such as computers, cameras and communication devices.

22. office is open 24 hours a day and is directly linked to the League of Arab States operations room in Cairo and to the groups deployed across Syria. The room receives daily reports from the field teams and conveys special instructions for monitoring. Owing to the volume of work, an additional operations room was opened at the Mission headquarters in Damascus with the task of allocating individuals and assigning committees on follow- up, detainees, the media and financial affairs. It coordinates with the main operations room at the offices of the League of Arab States.

23. In Latakia and Deir Al-Zor, the Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists. In Latakia, thousands surrounded the Mission’s cars, chanting slogans in favour of the President and against the Mission. The situation became out of control and monitors were attacked. Two sustained light injuries and an armoured car was completely crushed. In order to address the matter, the Head of Mission contacted the Syrian committee responsible for coordination with the Mission. Nevertheless, the Head of the Mission ordered the immediate return of the two groups to Damascus. He met the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made a strongly- worded formal protest. The Syrian side strongly condemned the incident and extended a formal apology, explaining that the events were not in any sense deliberate. In order to emphasize the point, the Syrian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs met with the members of the Latakia team and stated that the Syrian Government would address the shortcoming immediately and guarantee the safety and security of observers everywhere. He apologized to them for the unfortunate and unintentional incidents. The members were then assigned to new zones after four days’ rest.

VI. Implementation of the Mission’s mandate under the protocol

An operations room was established at the offices of the League of Arab States in Damascus. The

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24. The Head of the Mission stresses that this assessment in terms of the provisions of the protocol summarizes the findings of the groups as relayed by group leaders at their meeting with the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012.

A. Monitoring and observation of the cessation of all violence by all sides in cities and residential areas

25. On being assigned to their zones and starting work, the observers witnessed acts of violence perpetrated by Government forces and an exchange of gunfire with armed elements in Homs and Hama. As a result of the Mission’s insistence on a complete end to violence and the withdrawal of Army vehicles and equipment, this problem has receded. The most recent reports of the Mission point to a considerable calming of the situation and restraint on the part of those forces.

26. In Homs and Dera‘a, the Mission observed armed groups committing acts of violence against Government forces, resulting in death and injury among their ranks. In certain situations, Government forces responded to attacks against their personnel with force. The observers noted that some of the armed groups were using flares and armour-piercing projectiles.

27. In Homs, Idlib and Hama, the Observer Mission witnessed acts of violence being committed against Government forces and civilians that resulted in several deaths and injuries. Examples of those acts include the bombing of a civilian bus, killing eight persons and injuring others, including women and children, and the bombing of a train carrying diesel oil. In another incident in Homs, a police bus was blown up, killing two police officers. A fuel pipeline and some small bridges were also bombed.

28. The Mission noted that many parties falsely reported that explosions or violence had occurred in several locations. When the observers went to those locations, they found that those reports were unfounded.

29. The Mission also noted that, according to its teams in the field, the media exaggerated the nature of the incidents and the number of persons killed in incidents and protests in certain towns.

B. Verifying that Syrian security services and so-called shabiha gangs do not obstruct peaceful demonstrations

30. According to their latest reports and their briefings to the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012 in preparation for this report, group team leaders witnessed peaceful demonstrations by both Government supporters and the opposition in several places. None of those demonstrations were disrupted, except for some minor clashes with the Mission and between loyalists and opposition. These have not resulted in fatalities since the last presentation before the Arab Ministerial Committee on the Situation in Syria at its meeting of 8 January 2012.

31. The reports and briefings of groups leaders state that citizens belonging to the opposition surround the Mission on its arrival and use the gathering as a barrier from the security services. However, such incidents have gradually decreased.

32. The Mission has received requests from opposition supporters in Homs and Deraa that it should stay on-site and not leave, something that may be attributable to fear of attack after the Mission’s departure.

C. Verifying the release of those detained in the current incidents

33. The Mission received reports from parties outside Syria indicating that the number of detainees was 16,237. It also received information from the opposition inside the country that the number of detainees was 12,005. In validating those figures, the teams in the field discovered that there were discrepancies between the lists, that information was missing and inaccurate, and that names were repeated. The Mission is communicating with the concerned Government agencies to confirm those numbers.

34. The Mission has delivered to the Syrian Government all of the lists received from the Syrian opposition inside and outside Syria. In accordance with the protocol, it has demanded the release of the detainees.

35. On 15 January 2012, President Bashar Al-Assad issued a legislative decree granting a general amnesty for crimes perpetrated in the context of the events from 15 March 2011 through to the issuance of the decree. In implementation of the amnesty, the relevant Government authorities have been periodically releasing detainees in the various regions so long as they are not wanted in connection with other crimes. The Mission

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has been supervising the releases and is monitoring the process with the Government’s full and active coordination.

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36. On 19 January 2012, the Syrian government stated that 3569 detainees had been released from military and civil prosecution services. The Mission verified that 1669 of those detained had thus far been released. It continues to follow up the issue with the Government and the opposition, emphasizing to the Government side that the detainees should be released in the presence of observers so that the event can be documented.

37. The Mission has validated the following figures for the total number of detainees that the Syrian government thus far claims to have released:

• Before the amnesty: 4,035 • After the amnesty: 3,569.

The Government has therefore claimed that a total of 7,604 detainees have been released. 38. The Mission has verified the correct number of detainees released and arrived at the following figures: • Before the amnesty: 3,483 • After the amnesty: 1,669

The total number of confirmed releases is therefore 5152. The Mission is continuing to monitor the process and communicate with the Syrian Government for the release of the remaining detainees.

D. Confirming the withdrawal of the military presence from residential neighbourhoods in which demonstrations and protests occurred or are occurring

39. Based on the reports of the field-team leaders and the meeting held on 17 January 2012 with all team leaders, the Mission confirmed that all military vehicles, tanks and heavy weapons had been withdrawn from cities and residential neighbourhoods. Although there are still some security measures in place in the form of earthen berms and barriers in front of important buildings and in squares, they do not affect citizens. It should be noted that the Syrian Minister of Defence, in a meeting with the Head of the Mission that took place on 5 January 2012, affirmed his readiness to accompany the Head of the Mission to all sites and cities designated by the latter and from which the Mission suspects that the military presence had not yet been withdrawn, with a view to issuing field orders and rectifying any violation immediately.

40. Armoured vehicles (personnel carriers) are present at some barriers. One of those barriers is located in Homs and some others in Madaya, Zabadani and Rif Damascus. The presence of those vehicles was reported and they were subsequently withdrawn from Homs. It has been confirmed that the residents of Zabadani and Madaya reached a bilateral agreement with the Government that led to the removal of those barriers and vehicles.

E. Confirming the accreditation by the Syrian Government of Arab and international media organizations and that those organizations are allowed to move freely in all parts of Syria

41. Speaking on behalf of his Government, the Syrian Minister of Information confirmed that, from the beginning of December 2011 to 15 January 2012, the Government had accredited 147 Arab and foreign media organizations. Some 112 of those organizations entered Syrian territory, joining the 90 other accredited organizations operating in Syria through their full-time correspondents.

42. The Mission followed up on this issue. It identified 36 Arab and foreign media organizations and several journalists located in a number of Syrian cities. It also received complaints that the Syrian Government had granted some media organizations authorization to operate for four days only, which was insufficient time, according to those organizations. In addition to preventing them from entering the country until they had specified their destinations, journalists were required obtain further authorization once they had entered the country and were prevented from going to certain areas. The Syrian Government confirmed that it grants media organizations operating permits that are valid for 10 days, with the possibility of renewal.

43. Reports and information from some sectors [teams] indicate that the Government places restrictions on the movement of media organizations in opposition areas. In many cases, those restrictions caused journalists to trail the Mission in order to do their work.

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44. In Homs, a French journalist who worked for the France 2 channel was killed and a Belgian journalist was injured. The Government and opposition accused each other of being responsible for the incident, and both sides issued statements of condemnation. The Government formed an investigative committee in order to determine the cause of the incident. It should be noted that Mission reports from Homs indicate that the French journalist was killed by opposition mortar shells.

Annex 2. A list of media organizations identified and a list of media organizations that entered Syria, according to the official information.

VII.

A.

Obstacles encountered by the Mission Monitors Some of the experts nominated were not capable of taking on such a responsibility and did not have

45. prior experience in this field.

46. Some of the observers did not grasp the amount of responsibility that was being placed on them and the importance of giving priority to Arab interests over personal interests.

47. In the course of field work, some observers were unable to deal with difficult circumstances, which are at the core of their duties. Monitors must have certain traits and the specializations required for such work.

48. A number of the observers are elderly, and some of them suffer from health conditions that prevent them from performing their duties.

49. Twenty-two observers declined to complete the mission for personal reasons. Some observers offered unfounded reasons, which were not accepted by the Head of the Mission, while others had a personal agenda.

Annex 3. List of the names of observers who declined to complete the Mission.

50. Some observers reneged on their duties and broke the oath they had taken. They made contact with officials from their countries and gave them exaggerated accounts of events. Those officials consequently developed a bleak and unfounded picture of the situation.

51. Some of the observers in the various zones are demanding housing similar to their counterparts in Damascus or financial reimbursement equivalent to the difference in accommodation rates resulting from the difference in hotel standards or accommodation in Damascus. These issues do not warrant comment.

52. Some observers are afraid to perform their duties owing to the violent incidents that have occurred in certain locations. The unavailability of armoured cars at all the sites and the lack of bulletproof vests have negatively affected some observers’ ability to carry out their duties.

Comments of the Head of the Mission concerning the observers

53. Some of the observers, unfortunately, believed that their journey to Syria was for amusement, and were therefore surprised by the reality of the situation. They did not expect to be assigned to teams or to have to remain at stations outside the capital or to face the difficulties that they encountered.

54. Some of the observers were not familiar with the region and its geography. The unavailability of armoured vehicles and protective vests had a negative effect on the spirits of some observers.

55. Some of the observers experienced hostility both from the Syrian opposition and loyalists. This hostility also had a negative effect on their spirits.

56. Despite the foregoing comments, the performance of many of the observers was outstanding and praiseworthy. Those who underperformed will improve with experience and guidance.

B. Security restrictions

57. Although it welcomed the Mission and its Head and repeatedly emphasized that it would not impose any security restrictions that could obstruct the movement of the Mission, the Government deliberately attempted to limit the observers’ ability to travel extensively in various regions. The Government also attempted to focus the attention of the Mission on issues in which it is interested. The Mission resisted those attempts and responded to them in a manner that allowed it to fulfil its mandate and overcome the obstacles that stood in the way of its work.

C. Communication equipment

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58. The Mission communicates with the various groups by mobile phones and facsimile machines connected to the local Syrian telephone network. Occasional cuts in service prevent the Mission from communicating with the groups.

59. The Mission was equipped with 10 Thuraya satellite phones. Such devices are hard to use inside buildings owing of the difficulty in obtain a satellite signal. As a result, ordinary phones and fax machines, which are not considered secure communications equipment, were used to send daily reports, instead.

60. The communication equipment the Qatari observers brought with them was held at the Jordanian border, despite demands made by the Head of the Mission to the Syrian authorities to permit entry of that equipment. That notwithstanding, the amount of equipment would not have been enough to meet the needs of all sites and station.

61. The Mission does not have portable two-way radios for communication between team members. The Chinese Embassy provided 10 such radios as a gift to the Mission. They were used in three sectors only.

62. capital.

63. work in

D.

Internet service is unavailable in some regions, and in other areas it is intermittent, including in the

There are no cameras attached to the vehicles used by the Mission, which would facilitate observers’ dangerous areas.

Transportation

64. drive vehicles and 10 sedans. It should be noted that the Mission’s mandate requires the used of armoured four- wheel drive vehicles, given the nature of the Mission. The number of such vehicles currently available does not satisfy the needs of the Mission, particularly for transportation into trouble spots.

65. When it was first deployed, the Mission rented several cars from local sources for use in monitoring operations. However, owing to some acts of violence directed against the field teams, the rental companies recalled those vehicles and their drivers out of fear for their safety.

66. The Mission encountered difficulties in hiring drivers because the opposition groups refused to allowf local drivers to enter their areas because they believed the drivers were members of the security services, which forces the observers to drive the vehicles themselves.

67. Some of the observers demanded to use vehicles sent by their countries, a demand that was denied by the Head of the Mission, who allocated the vehicles according to the needs of each zone.

Annex 4. List showing the number, types and distribution of vehicles and the countries that provided them.

E. The media

68. Since it began its work, the Mission has been the target of a vicious media campaign. Some media outlets have published unfounded statements, which they attributed to the Head of the Mission. They have also grossly exaggerated events, thereby distorting the truth.

69. Such contrived reports have helped to increase tensions among the Syrian people and undermined the observers’ work. Some media organizations were exploited in order to defame the Mission and its Head and cause the Mission to fail.

VIII. Basic needs of the Mission, should its mandate be renewed

• 100 additional young observers, preferably military personnel • 30 armoured vehicles • Light protective vests • Vehicle-mounted photographic equipment

• Modern communications equipment • Binoculars, ordinary and night-vision IX. Evaluation:

The Mission has 38 cars at its disposal (23 armoured and 15 non-armoured), including 28 four-wheel

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70. The purpose of the Protocol is to protect Syrian citizens through the commitment of the Syrian Government to stop acts of violence, release detainees and withdraw all military presence from cities and residential neighbourhoods. This phase must lead to dialogue among the Syrian sides and the launching of a parallel political process. Otherwise, the duration of this Mission will be extended without achieving the desired results on the ground.

71. The Mission determined that there is an armed entity that is not mentioned in the protocol. This development on the ground can undoubtedly be attributed to the excessive use of force by Syrian Government forces in response to protests that occurred before the deployment of the Mission demanding the fall of the regime. In some zones, this armed entity reacted by attacking Syrian security forces and citizens, causing the Government to respond with further violence. In the end, innocent citizens pay the price for those actions with life and limb.

72. The Mission noted that the opposition had welcomed it and its members since their deployment to Syria. The citizens were reassured by the Mission’s presence and came forward to present their demands, although the opposition had previously been afraid to do so publicly owing to their fear of being arrested once again, as they had been prior to the Mission’s arrival in Syria. However, this was not case in the period that followed the last Ministerial Committee statement, although the situation is gradually improving.

73. The Mission noted that the Government strived to help it succeed in its task and remove any barriers that might stand in its way. The Government also facilitated meetings with all parties. No restrictions were placed on the movement of the Mission and its ability to interview Syrian citizens, both those who opposed the Government and those loyal to it.

74. In some cities, the Mission sensed the extreme tension, oppression and injustice from which the Syrian people are suffering. However, the citizens believe the crisis should be resolved peacefully through Arab mediation alone, without international intervention. Doing so would allow them to live in peace and complete the reform process and bring about the change they desire. The Mission was informed by the opposition, particularly in Dar‘a, Homs, Hama and Idlib, that some of its members had taken up arms in response to the suffering of the Syrian people as a result of the regime’s oppression and tyranny; corruption, which affects all sectors of society; the use of torture by the security agencies; and human rights violations.

75. Recently, there have been incidents that could widen the gap and increase bitterness between the parties. These incidents can have grave consequences and lead to the loss of life and property. Such incidents include the bombing of buildings, trains carrying fuel, vehicles carrying diesel oil and explosions targeting the police, members of the media and fuel pipelines. Some of those attacks have been carried out by the Free Syrian Army and some by other armed opposition groups.

76. The Mission has adhered scrupulously to its mandate, as set out in the Protocol. It has observed daily realities on the ground with complete neutrality and independence, thereby ensuring transparency and integrity in its monitoring of the situation, despite the difficulties the Mission encountered and the inappropriate actions of some individuals.

77. Under the Protocol, the Mission’s mandate is one month. This does not allow adequate time for administrative preparations, let alone for the Mission to carry out its task. To date, the Mission has actually operated for 23 days. This amount of time is definitely not sufficient, particularly in view of the number of items the Mission must investigate. The Mission needs to remain on the ground for a longer period of time, which would allow it to experience citizens’ daily living conditions and monitor all events. It should be noted that similar previous operations lasted for several months or, in some cases, several years.

78. Arab and foreign audiences of certain media organizations have questioned the Mission’s credibility because those organizations use the media to distort the facts. It will be difficult to overcome this problem unless there is political and media support for the Mission and its mandate. It is only natural that some negative incidents should occur as it conducts its activities because such incidents occur as a matter of course in similar missions.

79. The Mission arrived in Syria after the imposition of sanctions aimed at compelling to implement what was agreed to in the Protocol. Despite that, the Mission was welcomed by the opposition, loyalists and the Government. Nonetheless, questions remains as to how the Mission should fulfil its mandate. It should be noted that the mandate established for the Mission in the Protocol was changed in response to developments on the ground and the reactions thereto. Some of those were violent reactions by entities that were not mentioned

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in the Protocol. All of these developments necessitated an expansion of and a change in the Mission’s mandate. The most important point in this regard is the commitment of all sides to cease all acts of violence, thereby allowing the Mission to complete its tasks and, ultimately, lay the groundwork for the political process.

80. Should there be agreement to extend its mandate, then the Mission must be provided with communications equipment, means of transportation and all the equipment it requires to carry out its mandate on the ground.

81. On the other hand, ending the Mission’s work after such a short period will reverse any progress, even if partial, that has thus far been made. This could perhaps lead to chaos on the ground because all the parties involved in the crisis thus remain unprepared for the political process required to resolve the Syrian crisis.

82. Since its establishment, attitudes towards the Mission have been characterized by insincerity or, more broadly speaking, a lack of seriousness. Before it began carrying out its mandate and even before its members had arrived, the Mission was the target of a vicious campaign directed against the League of Arab States and the Head of the Mission, a campaign that increased in intensity after the observers’ deployment. The Mission still lack the political and media support it needs in order to fulfil its mandate. Should its mandate be extended, the goals set out in the Protocol will not be achieved unless such support is provided and the Mission receives the backing it needs to ensure the success of the Arab solution.

X. Recommendations:

83. In view of the above and of the success achieved in executing the provision of the Protocol, which the Syrian Government pledged to implement, I recommend the following:

• The Mission must be provided with administrative and logistic support in order allow it to carry out its tasks. The Mission must also be give the media and political support required to create an appropriate environment that will enable it to fulfil its mandate in the required manner.

• The political process must be accelerated and a national dialogue must be launched. That dialogue should run in parallel with the Mission’s work in order to create an environment of confidence that would contributes to the Mission’s success and prevent a needless extension of its presence in Syria.

Annexes

1. List of observers, their nationalities and their distribution.

2. List of media organizations identified and a list of media organizations that entered Syria, according to the official information.

3. List of the names of observers who declined to complete the Mission. 4. List showing the number, types and distribution of vehicles and the countries that provided them.

El estilo terrorista que se vio en Libia, ahora en Siria

Eso le pasó a este joven sirio por hablar con los observadores de la liga Arabe y contarles lo que realmente acontece en su país.
Si esos son sirios peleando por su país y pos su democracia, por lo menos van por mal camino.

Todavía están muy recientes las imágenes de los crímenes salvajes cometidos en Libia por esos famosos "rebeldes".
Esos observadores retirados a toda prisa, ya han redactado su informe sobre lo que han visto y oído en Siria. Pero desde Qatar, han prohibido su publicación. Curiosamente Qatar preside ahora la liga árabe, cuando no era su turno ( lo habrá comprado?).
A François Hollande candidato socialista para las presidenciales francesas,  no lo ha comprado, lo ha vuelto loco, igual que unos cuantos políticos franceses que ha seducido económicamente ( queda más bonito eso que llamarles vendidos). Ni qué decir cómo el clan Hariri sedujo al ex-presidente Jacques Chirac.